Danger and Detention:  A Second Generation of Bail Reform by Goldkamp, John S.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 76 | Issue 1 Article 1
1985
Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of
Bail Reform
John S. Goldkamp
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1985)
0091-4169/85/7601-1
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 76, No. I
Copyright 0 1985 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
CRIMINAL LAW
DANGER AND DETENTION: A SECOND
GENERATION OF BAIL REFORM*
JOHN S. GOLDKAMP**
Some risk is therefore imposed on the innocent; in the name of our




Given two decades of controversy and reform preceding the
passage of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 by the 98th Con-
gress, the federal preventive detention law represents landmark leg-
islation-if not for actually breaking new ground, at least for
formally legitimizing the direction in bail, pretrial release and deten-
tion procedure in the United States innovated in the District of Co-
lumbia and a number of states during the 1970's.2 Responding to
heightened public fear of crime during the mid and late 1970's, leg-
islatures increasingly have scrutinized bail practices during, the
1980's. The resulting variety of revisions has been motivated by the
common assumption that, as best summarized by the United States
Senate,
there is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous de-
fendants as to whom neither the imposition of stringent release condi-
tions nor the prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Marsha Levick, Michael
Gottfredson, Alan Harland, Alan Henry, Dewaine Gedney, Kay Harris and Andrew von
Hirsch for their valuable comments. In addition, Valerie Jones, Mark Bellavia and
Charles Meyer are sincerely thanked for their assistance during the research.
** Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Temple University. Ph.D.
1977, M.A. 1975, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany;
B.A., Wesleyan University, 1969.
1 Bedau, Capital Punishment in MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 150, 169 (T. Regan ed.
1980).
2 See Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 1, 98 Stat. 1976
(1984) (formerly S. 1762) [hereinafter cited as Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984].
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the safety of the community or other persons. It is with respect to this
limited group of offenders that the courts must be given the power to
deny release pending trial. 3
In new laws in many jurisdictions in the United States during the
1970's and 1980's, 4 dramatic changes in legal policy aimed at public
safety have superimposed a second wave of "reform" over the ac-
complishments and/or shortcomings of the earlier bail reform
movement.
The underlying philosophy of recent reforms is markedly differ-
ent from those of the 1960's which aimed principally at eliminating
the use of inappropriate pretrial detention, especially among poor
defendants held in crowded urban jails.5 Shaped primarily out of
concern for protecting the public from potentially dangerous de-
fendants, the spirit and substance of the new laws6 stand in striking
contrast to goals related to assuring the defendant's appearance at
court proceedings that dominated debate and reform efforts during
the 1960's. 7
The concerns about pretrial detention and bail that motivated
the first decade of bail reform ranged from the conditions of con-
finement in American jails to questions about the constitutionality
of pretrial detention." Critics argued that bail practices determining
3 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, at 6-7 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 225].
4 See infra notes 57 and accompanying text. As of December 1984, in addition to the
Federal government, 34 states and the District of Columbia have provisions expanding
the use of pretrial detention or of more restrictive release conditions, ostensibly in re-
sponse to concerns about public safety or the danger posed by defendants released
before trial.
5 See D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964 (1964) (working paper
for National Bail Conference); R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM (1967); W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM
IN AMERICA (1976); Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on
the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1963).
6 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 8.
7 See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE introduction (Tent. Draft
1968). In the early 1960's the Vera Institute sought to reform judicial bail practices in
New York through the pioneering efforts of the Manhattan Bail Project, thus launching
the bail reform movement. See A. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (reprint ed.
1966); CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (F. Frankfurter & R. Pound eds. reprint ed.
1968); Special Project, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 693 (1958); Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadel-
phia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954); [hereinafter cited as Foote, Compelling Appearance in
Court]; Programs in Criminal Justice Forum-Vera Institute ofJustice Ten-Year Report
1961-1971, Vera Institute ofJustice, (1972). Contemporaneously, the Federal govern-
ment was inaugurating the War Against Poverty. See POVERTY IN AMERICA, (M. Gordon
ed., 1965). Also, the United States Supreme Court embarked on a decade of expanding
the rights of criminal defendants. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., THE CRIMINAL
LAW REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH: 1960-1974 (1975).
8 For discussions of the conditions of confinement in American jails at the time, see
R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHErrO (1975); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
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the allocation of detention among defendants were: (1) arbitrary
and chaotic; (2) that they discriminated among defendants based on
their relative wealth or lack of it; (3) that judges abused their discre-
tion in deciding bail and wielded bail and detention punitively or in
line with other nonlegitimate purposes; (4) that judges used bail not
only to assure the appearance of defendants in court but to detain
defendants they viewed as dangerous; and (5) that detention before
trial was tantamount to punishment prior to adjudication. 9 In the
1960's, among the responses to these questions were: (1) the Vera-
type reform that advocated increased use of personal recognizance
release (ROR) based on information about defendants' community
ties;' 0 (2) the National Bail Conference convened in 1964;11 (3) en-
actment of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966;12 and (4) condi-
tional release and deposit bail programs which proliferated during
the late 1960's and early 1970's.13
A major policy debate during the 1960's centered on the goals
of bail and the acceptable uses for pretrial detention. Many critics
condemned the then prevailing system of cash bail that allowed
judges to detain defendants indirectly by setting unaffordable bail
without giving reasons and for questionable purposes, chiefly to
ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 101 (1973). Special reports
on investigations of state and local jails during the 1960's and 1970's included: A. ASH-
MAN, LOCKUP: NORTH CAROLINA LOOKS AT ITS LOCAL JAmS (1969); CALIFORNIA BOARD
OF CORRECTIONS, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIAJAILS (1970); H. MATrICK & R. SWEET, ILLINOIS
JAILS (1969); NEW YORK STATE COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION, COUNTY JAILS AND PENIEN-
TIARIES IN NEW YORK STATE (1966); G. Stracensky, C. Freil, J. Barrum & G. Killinger,
Texas Jails-Problems and Reformation (Criminal Justice Monograph Vol. III, No. 4
1970). For examples of litigation involving jail issues, see generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Wallace v. Kern, 520 F. 2d 400
(2d Cir., cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1975); Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305 (N.D.
Ohio 1974); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
9 See A. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (Reprint ed. 1966); D. FREED & P.
WALD, supra note 5; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 5; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL
SERVICES AGENCIES, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
DIVERSION: RELEASE (1968); STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 7; P.
WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE; Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts. I and II) 113
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1125 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Foote, Crisis in Bail I & II]; Foote,
Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 7; Single, The Unconstitutional Administration of
Bail- Bellamy v. The Judges of New York City, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 459 (1972). See generally J.
GOLDEAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSSED (1979); Goldkamp, Bai Discrimination and Con-
trol, 16 CRIM.JUST. ABSTRACTS 1 (Mar. 1984); Goldkamp, Philadelphia Revisited: An Exami-
nation of Bail and Detention Two Decades After Foote, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 179 (1980).
10 The Vera reform was widely replicated across the United States during the 1960's.
See T. THOMAS, supra note 5; Friedman, The Evaluation of a Bail Reform, 7 PoL'Y ScI.
(1976); Wice, Bail Reform in American Cities, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 770 (1973); Wice & Simon,
Pretrial Release: A Survey of Alternative Practices, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1970, at 60.
11 See D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 5.
12 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (repealed 1984).
13 See W. THOMAS, supra note 5.
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confine defendants "preventively"' 4 whom they viewed as danger-
ous. Commentators objected to preventive detention based on pub-
lic safety concerns using a cash bail system for many reasons: (1)
the "danger" concern was not an appropriate constitutional orienta-
tion for bail (for its only legitimate use was to insure the appearance
of defendants at court); 1 5 (2) the cash system allowed danger-ori-
ented detention decisions to be made sub rosa with no chance for
redress by the defendant; (3) preventive detention was predicated
on prediction of future conduct based on inconclusive data (such as
arrest records) relating to past conduct; (4) judicial selection of par-
ticular cash bail amounts by judges had no practical relationship to
the dangerous proclivities of defendants; and (5) defendants de-
tained as a result of unaffordable bail were handicapped at later ju-
dicial stages. 16
Preventive detention, as the "danger" perspective on bail and
14 See, e.g., Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 7; Foote, Crisis in Bail I &
II, supra note 9.
15 Reform-oriented critics buttressed their central premise, that bail was constitu-
tionally designed only as a vehicle for assuring the appearance of defendants at court,
partly by interpretations of the historical origins of bail. See Preventive Detention: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970); Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Federal
Bail Reform: Hearings on H.R. 3576, H.R. 3577, H.R. 3578, H.R. 5923, H.R. 6271, H.R.
6934, H.R. 10195; and S. 1357 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 7; Foote,
Crisis in Bail I & II, supra note 9. They also supported their arguments by citing a 1951
decision, Stack v. Boyle, in which the United States Supreme Court referred in dicta to
"the traditional rights of the accused to freedom before conviction" and "the purpose of
assuring the presence of the defendant." 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951). Opponents of this
strict interpretation pointed to a case heard bv the Supreme Court during the same
term, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), for authority that in addition to insuring
a defendant's attendance, bail could be decided to protect the public from potentially
dangerous defendants as well. Historical rationales were employed by adherents of this
point of view also. See Duker, The Right to Bail. A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33
(1977); Hess, Pretrial Detention and the District of Columbia Crime Act-The Next Step in Bail
Reform, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 277 (1971); Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (pts.
1 & 2), 60 GEo. L.J. 1139, 1381 (1972); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of
Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969). For a review of the two schools of thought,
seeJ. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF AcCUSED (1979).
16 See, e.g., J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 15; STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE,
supra, note 7; Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1970); Ervin, Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal
Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 290 (1971); Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra
note 7; Foote, Crisis in Bail I & II, supra note 9; Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence
on Criminal Procedure, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1974); Paulsen, Pre-trial Release in the United
States, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 109 (1966); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 641 (1964); Single, supra note 9; Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the
World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371 (1970).
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pretrial detention has become identified,' 7 may have remained the
minority view during the 1960's.18 When Congress passed the first
comprehensive preventive detention law in the United States for im-
plementation in the District of Columbia,' 9 however, Congress for-
mally recognized its emergence as at least a co-equal bail rationale.
Beginning in the 1970's and continuing into the 1980's, the "bail re-
form movement," which had launched such innovations as ROR,
conditional release and deposit bail programs based on a platform
that insuring a defendant's appearance was the sole appropriate
business of bail, tellingly modified its platform to accommodate con-
cern for protecting the public from dangerous defendants.20
Prior to the passage of the Federal law in 1984, evidence of the
degree to which emphasis in bail matters had shifted began appear-
ing in surprisingly explicit language in legislation. The recent Flor-
ida law, for example, instructed quite clearly that "[i]t is the intent
of the Legislature that the primary consideration be the protection
of the community from risk of physical harm to persons." 2' A pro-
vision that sought to amend the California constitution (included in
the larger "Victims' Bill of Rights" package of the summer of 1982)
employed similar language mandating that "public safety shall be
the primary consideration" in the bail decision, narrowly failed to be
adopted. 22 Dicta in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
17 Although it may just as well be applied to uses of bail to prevent defendants from
absconding from court, "preventive detention" in common usage connotes practices
designed to permit the detention of defendants likely to pose a danger of reoffending if
released.
18 See, e.g., the language of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 and the STANDARDS
RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 7. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as 18 U.S.C. §3146 (1966)),
states that assuring the appearance of defendants is the only acknowledged purpose of
the bail decision at least for persons charged in noncapital cases. In capital cases the
judge may consider whether the defendant poses a "danger to any other person or to
the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1966), repealed by Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984,
supra note 2. In drafting its 1968 STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, the Ameri-
can Bar Association adopted a version recognizing only the appearance-insuring orien-
tation of bail and almost endorsed a danger-oriented preventive detention approach.
See STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 7, at Appendix C.
19 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 1332 (1981 & Supp. 1985); Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Preventive Detention Hearings].
20 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, supra note 9.
21 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(1) (West 1985).
22 Voters passed two amendments that included provisions modifying bail proce-
dures under the CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 in the summer of 1982. The best-known mea-
sure, the "Victim's Bill of Rights," not only required that "public safety bail" be made
the primary emphasis of bail practices, but also required judges to state reasons for the
court record when setting, reducing or denying bail or granting personal recognizance
release (California Proposition 8). The second measure, which was passed by a greater
1985]
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Schall v. Martin,23 ajuvenile detention case, the Supreme Court's de-
nial of certiorari in U.S. v. Edwards,24 and the enactment of the Fed-
eral Bail Reform Act of 1984 further illustrate how dramatically the
philosophy underlying the bail reform movement of the 1960's has
been transmogrified.
Given the shift in emphasis away from the appearance orienta-
tion of the 1960's, this Article examines the emergence of the un-
mistakable public safety focus in the laws of the 1980's25 and
evaluates its implications for the practice of pretrial release and de-
tention in the United States in the future. Due to the historical con-
troversy surrounding bail and pretrial detention and the nearly "fait
accompli" nature of these new reforms, it is critical that lawmakers
and the key participants in the American judicial process squarely
confront the character of these new laws, their underlying philoso-
phy, and their likely consequences.
II. THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING
DETENTION POLICY
Before considering the pronounced public safety emphasis of
recent bail laws, this section briefly will describe the key compo-
nents of bail law that have most influenced the use of pretrial deten-
tion and release in the United States. Although bail laws are
structurally diverse, common mechanisms have not only determined
detention policy in the past but, as a result of their modification
under the new laws, are shaping the new direction.
Prior to recent statutory revisions in which outright denial of
pretrial release is expressly contemplated and authorized for "dan-
gerous" defendants, policies regulating the pretrial detention of
criminal defendants in the United States generally have been only
indirectly discernible in the various statutes dealing with bail and
other pretrial release mechanisms. Except for the traditional provi-
sions which exclude persons charged with capital offenses (or in
some states, persons charged with offenses punishable by life
margin and thereby took effect over the provisions of the "Victim's Bill of Rights," ad-
ded instances in which defendants may be detained when they pose a danger. Id.
23 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2413 (1984).
24 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals opinion reviewed the constitutionality of the preven-
tive detention law in the District).
25 Just as the passage of legislation lags behind public sentiment on particular issues,
the practical impact of legislation may not be felt until sometime after its enactment.
Thus, this analysis focuses on federal and state statutes, rules and constitutional amend-
ments, not so much to suggest that such laws have been translated directly into current
changes in practice, but to underscore the potentially great effect these laws may have.
[Vol. 76
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imprisonment),26 detention policy has not been treated directly, but
26 See Table 1 in the appendix. Table 1 charts the prevalence of the three standard
features of traditional bail provisions which have limited the right to bail: limitations of
the right to bail based on capital charges or the availability of life imprisonment, proof-
and-presumption clauses, and prohibitions against excessive bail.
Before the new wave of pretrial detention legislation of roughly the last 15 years,
persons for whom bail (and pretrial release) "as a matter of right" could be denied
directly were defined by a traditional formula that differed little from state to state.
These laws generally excepted murder cases from the right to bail. See e.g., AtA. CONST.
art. I § 16; CONN. CONsT. art. I § 8; N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 11; PA. CONST. art. I, § 14;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; ALA. CODE § 15-13-3 (1975). Some states have modified this
traditional formula slightly by the inclusion of treason, IND. CONST. art. I, § 17; MiCH.
CONsT. art. I, § 15; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 9, or offenses punishable by life imprisonment
as nonbailable. See Ex Parte Hickerson, 95 Okla. Crim. 246, 244 P.2d 349 (1952); FLA.
CONsT. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I § 7; S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 15;
WIS. CONsT. art. I, § 8; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); VA. CODE
§ 19.2-120 (1950).
Virtually all right-to-bail provisions further condition ineligibility for release on bail
by the requirement that the judge determine whether the "proof is evident and the pre-
sumption is great." States without such a "proof-and-presumption" clause include New
York, North Carolina, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Other variations of the theme con-
ditioning denial of bail on a judicial presumption of guilt are found in Alabama, Geor-
gia, South Carolina and Vermont. See S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 15; VT. CONST. ch. II § 40;
ALA. CODE § 15-13-3 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1985). Interpre-
tation of the precise meaning of this clause in case law is generally absent, but see the
U.S. Supreme Court's questioning of the Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska in ar-
guments in Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982), in which Justice Brennan asked,
"What does 'presumption great' mean?" 30 CRIM. L. REP. 4189, 4190. The Assistant
Attorney General of Nebraska responded, "I suspect it means something considerably
more than preponderance of the evidence and something less than a reasonable doubt.
Perhaps it means that there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant will be
convicted." Id. at 4190. The Assistant Public Defender from Douglas County, Ne-
braska, later also responded to Justice Brennan's further inquiries on the "proof-and-
presumption" clause in that state's constitution: "Practically every state uses this lan-
guage in some manner or other. There seems to be three different interpretations of
language like this. One is 'that you can't even put on evidence because the language
creates an irrebuttable presumption.' Another is that the burden is upon the accused to
show that proof isn't evident or the presumption great that he will be convicted. The
third is that the state bears the burden of showing a high probability of guilt. Our posi-
tion is that it means 'high probability of guilt.'" Id. at 4191.
The traditional approach also has included adoption by the states of the eighth
amendment of the Federal Constitution, which prohibits excessive bail in cases where
bail is allowed as a matter of right. The eighth amendment of the Constitution states
only "nor should excessive bail be required." U.S. CONsT. amend VIII. Interpretations
of the excessive bail clause have left its precise meaning in doubt. In Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1 (1951), Chief Justice Vinson advised that "excessive" bail means "higher than
usually set" or more than is required to assure the defendant's appearance at court. Id.
at 4-5. The United States Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Sistrunk v. Lyons,
646 F.2d 64 (3d Cir., 1981) in which the court appeared to favor the interpretation that
excessiveness questions may only be raised in cases having a right to bail. Id. at 72-73.
The issue also was discussed by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Huihui v. Shimoda, 64
Hawaii 527, 644 P.2d 968 (1982), a case in which the Hawaii Supreme Court found that
the traditional constitutional prohibition against excessive bail clashed with a new stat-
ute permitting outright detention of certain categories of defendants: "[i]t therefore
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rather has been suggested or implied. This implied policy occurs
first in laws addressing judicial determination of bail generally (and
assignment of cash bail specifically), 27 and second in laws concern-
ing personal recognizance or release on conditions.
A. CRITERIA GOVERNING BAIL DETERMINATIONS GENERALLY
Even after the impetus toward reform of state laws provided by
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, today as many as ten states28
offer little guidance to the bail judge beyond the gross criteria defin-
ing a right to bail.29 In these states, the bail decision and, conse-
quently, the allocation of pretrial detention, are largely left to the
judiciary as "a matter of sound discretion"; 30 some statutes or court
rules, however, provide bail schedules which simply designate
amounts of cash bail for categories of criminal charges. 31
defies logic to interpret that constitutional provision as prohibiting bail set so unreason-
ably high as to be unobtainable and not reflective of legitimate state concerns on one
hand, while on the other as permitting the outright denial of bail absent reasonable
grounds, since both actions, under like circumstances, amount to the same thing." Id. at
539, 644 P.2d at 976. See also Duker, supra note 15, Foote, Crisis in Bail I & II, supra note
9.
27 Throughout Anglo-Saxon history, "bail" has stood for the arrangements made to
guarantee that an arrested person will appear in court to meet judgment. Financial or
cash bail, one form of such an assurance, is a reasonably recent (and predominantly
American) historical development. See Duker, supra note 15. More currently the "bail
decision" generally refers to the selection of a particular option- such as ROR, release
on conditions, or cash bail-designed to constrain a defendant from flight, or in some
jurisdictions, from crime during pretrial release.
An analysis of the U.S. Department of Justice's first national survey of inmates of
local jails, for example, found that 28 percent of detained defendants were held without
bail. The remainder were held because they could not raise their financial bails. See J.
GOLDKAMP, INMATES OF AMERICAN JAILS: A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY (1978); U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, NAT'L PRISONER STATISTICS BULLETIN No. SD-NPS-J-6P, CENSUS OF
JAILS AND SURVEY OFJAIL INMATES, 1978 (Feb. 1979); Goldkamp, AmericanJails: Character-
istics and Legal Predicaments of Inmates, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 223 (1979).
28 See CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6, LA. CONST. art. I, § 18; Miss.
CONST. art. III, § 29; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9; TEX.
CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 1 Ia, 13; UTAH CONST. art. I §§ 8, 9; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2901 to 2937 (1979 &
Supp. 1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 311-343 (West 1967 & Supp. 1985); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 99-5-1 to -35 (1972 & Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 12-13-I to -20
(1956 & Supp. 1984); TEX. [CRIM. PROC.] CODE ANN. art. 17 §§ 01-38 (Vernon 1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-20-1 to -9 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 62-Ic-i to -19 (1977).
29 Table 2 summarizes the criteria that state laws require judges to consider when
making the bail decision.
30 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901(a) (1983 & Supp. 1985).
31 See CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 1269 (Deering, 1982); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
319 (West 1967 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.71 (1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§46-9-301 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29:901.05 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1112
(Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-105 (1982); Wis. STAT. § 969.065 (1985); Ky.
RULES CRIM. PROC. Appendix A (1983); OHIO RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(d)(3); ALA. JUD.
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In other states, the impact of bail reform of 1960's vintage is
more evident in laws that list for judicial consideration at bail spe-
cific factors, such as the following: (1) the nature of the current
charge; (2) the weight of the evidence and the likelihood of convic-
tion; the possible criminal penalty; (3) the defendant's prior crimi-
nal history (including in three states, juvenile history);3 2 (4) prior
record of appearance in court; (5) whether the defendant was on
probation, parole or pretrial release in connection with an earlier
offense; (6) age; (7) length of residence in, and ties to the commu-
nity; (8) employment; (9) financial resources; (10) character, repu-
tation and mental condition; (11) past general conduct; (12) the
availability of persons to assist the person in attending court; and
(13) whether the person is an alcoholic or a drug addict.33 To the
extent that judges actually weigh these criteria in ruling out ROR
and setting unaffordable cash bail, these legal provisions may have
an important impact on detention policy. 34
AD. RULES 2 (Alabama Supreme Court Rules). Bail schedules have been criticized stren-
uously since the earliest years of bail reform because of the inequity inherent in setting
financial bail solely in line with the ranked seriousness of the criminal charges. Similarly
charged persons will have different abilities to afford the bail and thus different likeli-
hoods of release, regardless of the risks they may pose. See the discussion of Standard
10-5.4 in American Bar Association, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE, (1980) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A., PRETRIAL RE-
LEASE], which states in 10-5.4 (0 that "monetary conditions should never be set by refer-
ence to a predetermined schedule of amounts fixed according to the nature of the
charge but should be the result of an individualized decision, taking into account the
specialized circumstances of each defendant." Id. See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, supra note 9, at 27; Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189,
1200 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978). Cf.
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
32 In Indiana, in determining the "amount of bail," the judge considers, among other
factors, "the defendant's criminal or juvenile record, insofar as it demonstrates instabil-
ity and disdain for the court's authority to bring him to trial .. " See IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-33-8-4 (West Supp. 1985). Since 1975, Louisiana law has provided access to juve-
nile court history for defendants at bail. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 317 (West
1967 & Supp. 1985). Similarjuvenile and youthful offender criminal history are avail-
able to judges determining bail in New York. See N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAw §510.30
(2)(a)(v) (McKinney 1984).
33 Variations of the decision criteria summarized in Table 2 in the Appendix are dis-
cussed in J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED, supra note 9.
34 Several studies ofjudicial bail practices strongly suggest that in contrast to the lists
of considerations provided in the laws of some states, few criteria actually come into play
in judges' decisions. See, e.g., J. GOLDKAMP & M. GOTrFREDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR
BAIL: AN EXPERIMENT IN COURT REFORM, (1985); J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF AC-
CUSED, supra note 9; J. ROTH & P. WICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1978) (prepared for the U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Nat'l Institute of
Justice); Bock & Frazier, Official Standards Versus Actual Criteria in Bond Dispositions, 5 J.
CRIM.JUST. 321 (1977); Ebbesen & Konecni, Decision Making and Information Integration in
the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 805 (1975). Two
empirical studies of bail decisionmaking have shown that actual decision practices com-
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Although, theoretically, the criteria listed in laws instructing
judges how to formulate bail decisions ought to play an important
role in shaping bail practices and the use of pretrial detention that
follows, in fact, their influence on detention policy is considerably
diluted for two reasons: judges are free to ignore alternative criteria
and focus rather on criminal charge and prior criminal record, and
because the extent of detention resulting from cash bail decisions
either intentional (by conscious design of the bail judge) or uninten-
tional (largely from a defendant's lack of financial resources), is un-
known. Financial bail may be set as a reasonable assessment of what
it would take to encourage the defendant to appear at trial or possi-
bly to refrain from criminal behavior during pretrial release (that is,
because of the threat of financial loss, the judge may have set bail
based on a deterrent rationale), or it may be assigned at a level deliber-
ately beyond the defendant's likely ability to afford it, as a sub rosa
method of detention to prevent a defendant from fleeing or commit-
ting further dangerous acts (based on an incapacitative rationale). Ac-
cordingly, statutes specifying factors to be considered in setting bail
tend to be imprecise indicators of implicitly operating detention
policy.
B. ROR POLICY
Included among provisions for pretrial release and detention
determinations are laws outlining principles guiding the use of di-
rect release options, such as ROR or other nonfinancial conditions.
These policies are central because, to the extent that they are ad-
hered to by judges, they could have a great effect in determining
who definitely will not be a candidate for detention.3 5 The treatment
of ROR3 6 policy in state laws varies notably in substance and em-
phasis depending upon the state.3 7 Many state laws make mention
of ROR to note that it is permitted or to limit its applicability.38 In
port little with criteria outlined in statutory provisions or court rules. SeeJ. GoLDKAMP,
Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED, supra note 9. Bock & Frazier, Official Standards Versus Actual
Criteria in Bond Dispositions, 5 J. CRIM. JUST. 321, 324-28 (1977).
35 Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes the policies regarding ROR and the use of
nonfinancial conditions in American laws.
36 For the purpose of this analysis, unsecured bail-or bail requiring no deposit for
release but involving liability to court in the event of defendant flight-is treated as
equivalent to personal recognizance release or ROR.
37 Eight states do not refer to ROR as a bail option, including Connecticut, Georgia,
Idaho, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas and West Virginia.
38 For example, under New Hampshire law, all persons arrested for crime "shall,
before conviction, be released on personal recognizance or be bailable by sufficient
sureties, whichever justice may require." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:1 (1974).
In states where it is listed only as an option, ROR provisions quite obviously con-
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the remaining states and the District of Columbia,3 9 the Federal
law's presumption 40 that all defendants (in bailable categories)
should be released on ROR or unsecured bail, unless grounds exist
to believe that a defendant will pose an unusual risk not addressed
through outright pretrial release, has been adopted in some version.
To the extent that the presumption favoring ROR stated in the laws
tribute little toward forging a selective detention policy. Absent a strong release policy,
it may be assumed that pretrial detention would include a wide array of defendants and
reflect a more frequent, non-selective resort to confinement. See also CAL. CONsT. art. I,
§ 12; HAWAii CONsT. art. I, § 12; ALA. CODE § 15-13-4 (1975) (for misdemeanors only);
CAL. [PENAL] CODE §§ 1269(c), 1270 (Deering 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-4-104(a), -
105(0), -111 (1973) (limited); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1980 & Supp. 1985); IND.
CODE § 35-33-8-3 (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802(2) (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (1972 & Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 544.455 (Supp. 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-9-111 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178-4851 (1983) (limited to misde-
meanors for defendants with no prior records); N.Y. [GRIM. PROC.] LAw § 530.20 (Mc-
Kinney 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-3 (1982); VA. CODE § 19.2-123 (1950 & Supp.
1985); ARK. RULES GRIM. PROC. § 9.1; FLA. RULES GRIM. PROC. 3.130(4); LA. CODE GRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 319 (West 1967); N.J. RULES CRIM. PROC. § 3:26-1(a).
In some laws that mention ROR as a permissible bail option, its applicability is lim-
ited. For example, the Colorado statutes permit ROR in a strictly limited fashion. Spe-
cifically, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-104(a) (1973), allows that "[t]he defendant may be
released from custody upon execution by him of a personal recognizance" but states in
another section, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-105(o) (1973), that "[n]o person shall be re-
leased on personal recognizance until and unless the judge ordering the release has
before him reliable information concerning the accused, prepared or verified by a per-
son designated by the court, or substantiated by sworn testimony at a hearing before the
judge, from which an intelligent decision based on the criteria set forth ... can be
made." Id. Any defendant with a prior conviction for a class 1 misdemeanor within two
years or a felony within five years may not be released on ROR "unless the district attor-
ney consents." COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-106(n) (1973). Section 16-4-111 further limits
its applicability to persons charged with the least serious misdemeanors or "petty of-
fenses, or any unclassified offense for a violation of which the maximum penalty does
not exceed six months' imprisonment" and even in these cases, further restrictions are
provided. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-111 (1973).
39 See ALAsKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (1974 &
Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1981 & Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE § 811.2
(Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.520 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 942 (1964
& Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAws § 765.6 (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29:901 (1943);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(a),(b) (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245(3) (1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 23A-43-2 (1979 &
Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115, -116 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 7554
(1974); WIs. STAT. §§ 969.01, .02 (1985); ARIZ. RULES CRIM. PROC. 7.2(a); Ky. RULES
CRIM. PROC. 4.02; MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC. 6.02; N.D. RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(a); N.M.
[RULES] GRIM. PROC. 22(a); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. GRIM. RULES 3.2; Wyo. RULES GRIM.
PROC. 8(c)(1). Maine law permits speedy review in cases of bailable defendants in which
ROR has not been granted. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 942(3) (1964). In Maryland
and Michigan, the presumption of ROR is strengthened by requiring the judge to write
reasons when ROR is not granted. Md. Rules 4-216; MICH. CT. RULES § 6.110 (1985).
See People v. Spicer, 402 Mich. 406, 263 N.W. 2d 256 (1978).
40 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (origi-
nally codified 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966); repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, tit. II, ch. 1, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976 (1984)).
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is translated into judicial practice, and this is a questionable assump-
tion,41 the effect of these provisions on detention practices should
be to screen broad categories of defendants away from confinement,
thus producing a more restricted or selective use of pretrial deten-
tion than where such provisions do not exist.
C. POLICY GOVERNING PRETRIAL RELEASE ON CONDITIONS
A related feature of bail laws involves the employment of "con-
ditions of release," nonfinancial as well as financial, thus offering an
option beyond outright pretrial release (ROR) but short of confine-
ment. Conditional release provisions, products of the bail reform
movement of the 1960's and 1970's, are significant because in the
deceptive jargon of some of the statutes, defendants who cannot
"meet the conditions of release" set by the judge will remain de-
tained; and whether such probation-like alternatives are exhausted
as a matter of policy before selecting restrictive options likely to re-
sult in detention has great weight in determining which kinds of de-
fendants are likely to be detained routinely.
Although most jurisdictions discuss conditions of release in
their statutes, eighteen states are silent on this subject.4 2 Condi-
tions of release are treated in other states very unevenly. Some
states discuss release conditions for very narrow areas, such as in
cases involving domestic or family violence, 43 or in cases in which
the defendant is viewed as posing a specific danger.44 Laws in other
states mention conditions that may be set in addition to ROR or cash
bail designed to further reduce the risk of flight, or depending upon
the state, the danger posed by the defendant.45
These states list either a full range of release conditions to be
41 See supra note 34.
42 In Table 3 in the Appendix are the provisions dealing with conditional release.
States that do not have such provisions are Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.
43 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025 (1962); MINN. STAT. § 629.72 (1980); N.Y.
[CRIM. PROC.] LAW § 530.12, .13 (McKinney 1984).
44 See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-71 (Supp. 1984); N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. § 22(c).
45 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b) (1962); CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 1269d (Deering 1982
& Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(2) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2108
(1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 110-10 (1980 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-
3 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802(1) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.520
(1981); Mo. REV. STAT. § 544-455(1) (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law.
Co-op. 1976), VA. CODE § 19.2-123 (1983 & Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. §§ 969.02, .03
(1985); FLA. RULES CRIM. PROC. 3.131(6); Ky. RULES CRIM. PROC. 4.12; NJ. RULES Gov-
ERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:26-1(a); OHIO RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(C),(D). In these states no
specific policy governing the use of conditions of release is provided; rather the statutes
instruct, for example, that "in connection with either a secured release or on unsecured
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considered, or very few.4 6 Among the most common nonfinancial
conditions found in these provisions are the following: (1) custody
by a pretrial services or other public agency; (2) custody to a third
party or organization; (3) regular reporting to or supervision by a
pretrial services, probation or law enforcement agency; (4) restric-
tions on residence, travel, associations and activities; (5) prohibi-
tions against possessing weapons, alcohol or drug usage; (6)
requirements that employment be found or maintained, that educa-
tional or vocational programs be initiated or continued; (7) require-
ments that a defendant participate in counseling, drug or alcohol
treatment programs; and (8) part-time custody. Financial condi-
tions commonly include unsecured bail, deposit bail,47 cash, or sol-
vent sureties.48
release of any person the court may also impose one or more of the following condi-
tions .... DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2108 (1974).
46 See Table 3 in the Appendix.
47 Deposit bail, an innovation implemented first in Illinois during the mid-1960's, is
now provided for in 20 states, the District of Columbia and under Federal law. In Ore-
gon, deposit bail is the only form of financial bail permitted when set as a condition of
release. OR. REV STAT. § 135.265(2) (1985). Kentucky law makes deposit bail univer-
sally available in cash cases at the judge's option, and Michigan law has a presumption
favoring deposit bail. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146 (Supp. 1985); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 12.30.020(b)(4) (1962); CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 1269d (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1985) (for
misdemeanors); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1981 & Supp. 1985), FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 903.105 (West 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (1980 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE
§ 35-33-8-3 (Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE § 811.2 (1979 & Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 431.520 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 942(2)(c) (1964) (fifty percent deposit
plan); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 780.66 (1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 544.455(1) (Supp.
1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-13-10 (1956 & Supp.
1985); S.D. CODE ANN. § 23A-43-3 (1979 & Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554
(1974); ARK. RULES CRIM. PROC. 9.2(b); Ky. RULES CRIM. PROC. 4.12; N.J. RULES Gov-
ERNING CRIM. PRAc. 3:26-4(a); N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22(a); N.D. RULES CRIM. PROC.
tit. 46(a); PA. RULES CRIM PROC. 4006(1); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2; Wyo.
RULES CRIM. PROC. 8(c)(1). The Colorado scheme offers an interesting contrast to these
jurisdictions with deposit bail plans. Not only does Colorado law not include a provision
permitting a deposit option, but a Colordado court has interpreted COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-4-104(1)(b) (1973) as not allowingjudges to have discretion to employ deposit bail
to release defendants. People v. Dist. Ct. of Eighteenth Judicial Dist. ex rel. County of
Arapahoe, 196 Colo. 116, 581 P.2d 300 (1978). The implication is that defendants hav-
ing cash bail set must employ a bondsman if they do not have the financial resources
themselves. For a discussion of deposit bail and criticism of the bondsman's role, see,
e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE supra note 7; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PRETRIAL SERVICE AGENCIES, supra note 9; W. THOMAS, supra note 5. See also A. BEELEY,
supra note 7 at 39 (the bondsman is "anomalous parasite" to the American system of
justice and an "extra-legal liaison."
48 Many jurisdictions list "mandatory" conditions accompanying grants of pretrial
release, usually requiring that the defendant appear in court, not leave the state, and be
on "good behavior," or specifically, refrain from committing any crime. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142 (Supp. 1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3967(D) (1978); CAL. [PENAL] CODE
§ 1318 (Deering 1981 & 1985); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 2108 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 110-10 (1980 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE § 35-
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Theoretically, considerably more influence on detention policy
should be contributed by the conditional release provisions of the
remaining seventeen states, the District of Columbia, and the Fed-
eral government which stress release under the least onerous condi-
tion(s).49 The wording of these statutes generally resembles
Arizona's which states that
[a]ny person charged with an offense bailable as a matter of right shall
be released pending or during trial on his own recognizance, unless
the court determines in its discretion that such a release will not rea-
sonably assure his appearance as required. If such a determination is
made, the court may impose the least onerous condition or conditions ... which
will reasonably assure his appearance. 50
In these states, release conditions are prioritized in order of their
perceived onerousness, beginning usually with ROR, then un-
secured bail, followed by other nonfinancial, probation-like condi-
tions, deposit bail, cash bail, part-time custody, and ending up, in
some cases, with outright custody. There is a presumption that cash
bail will be used as a last, drastic alternative because it may produce
detention. In the District of Columbia, Wisconsin and the Federal
jurisdiction, financial conditions may not be applied when the goal
is to constrain the danger posed by defendants.51
33-8-3 (Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.487 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.250 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4956 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA.
CODE § 19.2-135 (1983); Wis. STAT. §§ 969.02, .03 (1985); ARIZ. RULES CRIM. PROC.
7.2, 7.3; R.I. RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(2)(d)(Superior Ct.).
49 Provisions of most of these state laws are patterned on the Federal Bail Reform
Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966) (repealed 1984). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3967(E) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-63c, -63d, -64a (Supp. 1985) (simplified
version of least onerous); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1981 & Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE
§ 811.2 (1979 & Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 942(2) (1964); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-901 (1943); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(a), (b) (1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 135.245(3) (1985); S.D. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 23A-43-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-11-116 (1982); ARIZ. RULES CRIM. PROC. 7.2(a); ARK. RULES CRIM.
PROC. 9.1(a), 9.2(a); MD. RULES 4-216 (criminal cases); MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC. 6.02;
N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22(a); N.D. RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(a); WASH. SUPERIOR CT.
CRIM. RULES 3.2: Wyo. RULES CRIM. PROC. 8(c)(i).
50 ARIZ. RULES CRIM. PROC. 7.2(a) (emphasis added).
51 See Wis. CONST. art. I §8(2); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a)(1981 & Supp. 1985); S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 16. See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES
AGENCIES, supra note 9; K. Feinberg, Promoting Accountability in Making Bail Decisions:
Congressional Efforts at Bail Reform (Feb. 1982) (paper presented at the Conference on
Public Danger, Dangerous Offenders, and the Criminal Justice System, Harvard
University).
1985] BAIL REFORM
III. EVALUATING THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROVISIONS IN RECENT
STATUTORY REVISIONS
Recent laws have transformed pretrial release and detention
policy by adopting provisions explicitly or implicitly focusing on the
restraint of defendants perceived as constituting a "danger" if re-
leased. Judges traditionally have responded to public safety con-
cerns sub rosa, detaining defendants by setting unaffordable bail.
Except for very specific situations, 52 however, Federal and state laws
had not explicitly authorized judicial consideration of defendant
dangerousness at bail until passage of the Federal Bail Reform Act
of 1966 53 and the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedures Act of 1970. 54 The District of Columbia law was the first
comprehensive attempt to address the many substantive and proce-
dural questions that long have been at the center of the preventive
detention controversy.55 By 1978, twenty-three states in addition to
the District of Columbia had laws addressing defendant danger as
an aspect of bail or pretrial detention decisionmaking. 56 Only six
years later, the number had grown to thirty-four states, the District
of Columbia and the Federal jurisdiction. 57 During the period fol-
lowing enactment of the District of Columbia statute, approximately
ten states revised their laws through constitutional amendments. 58
52 See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961) (Supreme Court author-
ized denial of bail in cases in which defendants were likely to interfere with the "orderly
progress of the trial and the fair administration ofjustice." Id. at 644); Carbo v. United
States 81 S. Ct. 662 (1961) (Supreme Court noted that "keeping a defendant in custody
during the trial to render fruitless any attempt to interfere with witnesses or jurors may,
in extreme or unusual cases,justify denial of bail." Id. at 668 (citation omitted)). These
specific "danger" oriented uses for bail, in contrast to the broader concepts of danger
discussed in the text, have not been viewed as controversial during the debates of the
last two decades.
53 The reference to defendant danger in the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966), was restricted to the narrow class of defendants
charged with capital offenses or seeking release pending appeal of their cases.
54 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321, -1332 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
55 See Preventive Detention Hearings, supra note 19.
56 By 1978, the District of Columbia and almost half the states had laws addressing
defendant danger in bail decisions. The states were Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Washington. See J. GOLDEAMP, Two CLASSES OF
ACCUSED (1979); Gaynes, Typology of State Laws Which Permit the Consideration of
Danger in the Pretrial Release Decision, Pretrial Services Resources Center (1982)
(mimeograph).
57 By the end of 1984, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Nevada, South Dakota, Wisconsin and the Federal government had ad-
ded danger provisions. Colorado revised its laws in the preceding six years along public
safety lines.
58 See ARIZ. CONsT. art. II § 22; CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19;
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The social and historical shift in the recent decades, away from
poverty and civil liberty concerns and toward a climate marked more
by heightened public fear of crime and "law and order" politics may
explain the evolution of the danger-oriented agenda of bail and pre-
trial detention practices. History will judge the second wave of bail
reform by looking at its implications for the legal principles under-
girding bail and pretrial detention in the United States, and its im-
pact on reducing serious crimes committed by defendants who are
released pending adjudication of earlier charges. A sound test for
evaluating preventive confinement laws based on dangerousness is
described by von Hirsch: "(1) there must be reasonably precise
legal standards of dangerousness; (2) the prediction methods used
must be subjected to careful and continuous validation; and (3) the
procedure for commitment must provide the defendant with certain
minimal procedural safeguards." 59
A. LEGAL STANDARDS OF DANGEROUSNESS IN BAIL
AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
Clearly defined standards for confining an individual are
needed so that the individual knows the proscribed action and its
consequences and so that the appropriateness of the deprivation of
liberty is determined in a legal arena which protects not only the
interests of the state, but also the rights of the individual. 60 In
short, given the substantial hardships faced by defendants who may
be detained under such measures, it is essential to ask, "Danger of
what?" In response to criticism of the highly discretionary sub rosa
approach to detention based on defendant dangerousness under the
traditional cash bail system, a number of the new measures have
sought to make the public safety rationale in bail explicit and to for-
mulate criteria through which the detention of dangerous defend-
ants might be specified and regulated. 61
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § I la; UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 8; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 8.
59 See von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted
Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717, 725 (1972).
60 Id. at 725-26.
61 Advocates of reform during the 1960's centered their criticism on the unbridled
discretion employed by judges deciding bail and their strong belief that bail practices
supposedly aimed only at ensuring the defendant's appearance at trial were actually op-
erating as a sub rosa system of preventive detention responding to public safety concerns.
See, e.g., Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 7; Foote, Crisis in Bail L supra
note 9; Foote, The Bail System and EqualJustice, FED. PROBATION 43 (September, 1955); D.
FREED & P. WALD, supra note 5; STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 7;
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Preventive Detention: A Policy Statement, 17
CRIME & DELINQ. 1 (1971). Proponents of preventive detention measures agreed that
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1. References to Pretrial Danger: Definitional Problems
Clear definition of public safety concerns is the first obstacle in
the study of the recent bail and pretrial detention laws that focus on
pretrial danger. Over one-third of the public safety-oriented laws
provide no definition of danger. Of the thirty-six jurisdictions hav-
ing bail or pretrial detention provisions responding to the issue of
pretrial danger, only twenty-four states, the District of Columbia
and the new Federal law make explicit reference to danger or public
safety concerns. 62 Recent debates have focused on two broad cate-
gories of concerns, the danger posed generally to the public by a
defendant, and the danger posed specifically to victims, witnesses or
the discretionary and hidden application of pretrial detention was objectionable, but
argued that the public safety orientation was legitimate and necessary. See NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, supra note 9; American Bar Association,
Task Force on Crime (Criminal Justice Section 1981) [hereinafter cited as Task Force on
Crime]; Feinberg, supra note 51; Mitchell, supra note 15. See also the laws in the District
of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 1332 (1981 & Supp. 1985)) and Wisconsin
(WIs. CONST. art. I, § 8) and the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3142
(c) Supp. 1985)) which authorize detention of defendants in a more comprehensive fash-
ion than previous law in the United States, but also prohibit the use of cash bail as a
decision option when pretrial danger is the primary concern.
62 The following states have no provisions that are classified as specifically oriented to
pretrial danger concerns: Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennes-
see, Wyoming and West Virgina. States with direct references to pretrial danger
include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin as well as the District of Columbia and the Federal jurisdiction.
Ten States with measures that imply danger concerns are Alabama, Arkansas, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Utah. Classification
of these states as having implicit danger orientations is based on the finding that,
although their provisions do not contain explicit mention of danger uses for bail or
pretrial detention, they do parallel those of other jurisdictions with explicit references.
An example may help illustrate the rationale underlying their classification as "danger
states": In Texas (TEX. CONST. art. I §, 1la), the following categories of defendants
may be excluded from a right to bail: (a) persons charged with felonies who have two
prior convictions for felonies; (b) persons charged with felonies who are on pretrial re-
lease in connection with a prior felony; and (c) persons accused of a felony involving the
use of a weapon who have one previous felony conviction. Although there is no discus-
sion of danger in that or related Texas bail provisions (TEX. [CRIM. PROC.] CODE ANN.
art. 17 §§ 01-38 [Vernon 1977]), the inference that this is a bail measure responding to
pretrial danger concerns as opposed to strictly appearance-oriented concerns is drawn
because of its similarity to provisions in California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois
and the District of Columbia. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; CoLo. CONST. art. II,
§ 19; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 1332 (1981 & Supp. 1985);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 804-1 to -9 (1976
& Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 110-6 (1980 & Supp. 1985). This approach was
employed in the classification of the remaining nine states with implied danger orienta-
tions as "danger states." The provisions containing danger references are presented in
Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix.
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prospective jurors if that defendant is released before trial. 63 Laws
vary noticeably, however, in their definition of these dangers, both
in terms of emphasis and specificity. 64
In approximately half of the states with explicit references, the
definition of danger is vague. Those definitions include, "safety of
the community, ' ' 65 "danger to the public," 66 "inimical of public
safety,"' 67 or "danger to any other person or to the community."68
Several other states attempt to be more precise by adding modifiers
to the general language just illustrated. 69 The specific safety con-
cern that witnesses or jurors may be harmed or intimidated by de-
fendants on pretrial release is stated explicitly in only nine states,
the District of Columbia and Federal law.70 Also, in six states the
courts may use bail and pretrial detention to prevent defendants
from interfering with the "judicial process" or the "orderly adminis-
tration of justice." 7' Other unusual danger definitions include a
Georgia law that considers the potential "threat" a defendant may
pose to "any property within the community" as a legitimate con-
63 See J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED (1979); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PRETRIAL SERVICE AGENCIES, supra note 9; Task Force On Crime, supra note 61.
64 See Table 4 in the Appendix for the specific phrasing of danger-related references.
65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 2101, 2105, 2107 (1974).
66 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 7554(a), (b) (1974).
67 MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC. 6.02.
68 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(b)(1985); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1962); MD. ANN.
CODE, art. 27, § 6161/2 (1957 & Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (West
1982 & Supp. 1985).
69 For example, in Colorado the concern is that a released defendant might place the
public in "significant peril." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19. In South Carolina and Virginia
the fear is that the defendant will pose an "unreasonable danger". S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-
15-10 (1976), VA. CODE § 19.2-120 (1983). In Arizona, defendants may be detained if
they pose a "substantial danger." ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(3). Other states are some-
what more precise in specifying that the danger risked by release of certain defendants is
the "danger" or "substantial" danger that they "will commit a serious crime." See, e.g.,
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (1976 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(b) (1983);
N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. Rules 22(c); WASH SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2(a). Other
states refer to the danger that other persons or the community will be exposed to the
risk of "physical" or "bodily harm" or "great" or "serious bodily harm." See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 8; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-4-111 (1973).
70 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (1985); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; WIsc. CONST. art. I, § 8;
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a) (1981 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901(c)(4)
(1983 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804.71 (1976 & Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT.
§ 629.72 (subd. 2) (1983) (in the context of domestic assault cases); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-534, -534.1 (1983); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2 (a); ALA.JUD. AD. RULES
2.
71 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901(c)(4) (1983 & Supp. 1984); HA-
wAiI REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-10(b)
(1983 & Supp. 1985); N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22(c); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM.
RULES 3.2(c).
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cern, 72 and laws in six states that allude to the danger defendants
may represent to themselves. 73
The vagueness of danger definitions in pretrial laws are made
more problematic by the manner in which they are framed.74 Three
kinds of provisions contain danger references in bail laws in the
United States: (1) provisions excluding particular categories of de-
fendants from the right to bail and/or pretrial release; (2) provi-
sions discussing "conditions of release"; and (3) provisions
discussing the factors to be weighed by judges in fixing bail or other
conditions of release.
2. Danger References Contained in Provisions Excluding Defendants from
a Right to Bail
The most common danger provision expands upon the tradi-
tional categories of defendants that may be excluded from bail.7 5 In
Illinois, defendants charged with "forcible felonies" while already
on pretrial release for a previous charge also may be denied bail. 76
In Indiana, defendants arrested while on probation or parole for an
earlier conviction may be detained. 77 Defendants charged with one
72 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901(c)1 to (c)(4) (1983 & Supp. 1985); but see United States v.
Delker (No. 84-1744) at 5 (the court acknowledges the legislative intent behind the Fed-
eral Bail Reform Act of 1984 giving "broader construction than merely danger of harm
involving physical violence" to pretrial danger).
73 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:6-a (1974); VA. CODE § 19.2-120 (1950); MD. RuLEs
OF CRIM. PROC. 721(d)(6); MINN. RuLEs GRIM. PROC. 6.02; OHIO RuLEs CRIM. PROC.
46(D); PA. RuLEs CRIM. PROC. 4003; WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2(c).
74 For classification of pretrial "danger"jurisdictions according to the kinds of provi-
sions containing the danger references, see Table 5 in the Appendix.
75 Traditionally, persons charged with capital offenses have been denied bail. A
number of states have added categories of defendants to those traditionally denied bail.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. 1985); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12(b),
(c); COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 9; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 1 la; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8; ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3961 (1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. 47 § 903.046 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984); HA-
WAIi REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-6 (1980 &
Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-5, -6 (West Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 6161/2 (1957 & Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (West 1982 & Supp.
1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.487 (1984); N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAW § 530.20 (McKinney
1984); VA. CODE § 19.2-120 (1950); ARK. RULES CRIM. PROC. 9.5. Several states include
possible life imprisonment as a criterion for denial of bail. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14;
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 7; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; HAWAI REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 638B
(1957 & Supp. 1985).
76 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-18 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
77 Under IND. CODE § 35-33-8-5-6 (Supp. 1985) persons charged with "forcible felo-
nies" while on pretrial release for a previous charge may be detained outright for up to
15 days. In the District of Columbia, a similar provision provides for a maximum of five
days detention for persons charged with "any offense" who may be on probation, parole
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of a long list of crimes may have release denied in states such as
Georgia, 78 while in Virginia the limitation on the right to bail does
not depend on the charged offenses at all; rather it is predicated on
whether there is "probable cause to believe that" a defendant "will
not appear for trial . . or [h]is liberty will constitute an unreasona-
ble danger to himself or the public." 79
Many of the state laws that incorporate a concern for defendant
danger in bail and detention laws through exclusion from a right to
bail directly allude to danger or public safety. In Arizona, the dan-
ger orientation is expressed in its constitution which excepts from a
right to bail persons charged with "[flelony offenses if the person
charged poses a substantial danger to any other person or the com-
munity." 80 The California constitution directly denies the right to
bail to persons charged with "[f]elony offenses involving acts of vio-
lence.., when the facts are evident or the presumption great and
the court finds . . . clear and convincing evidence that there is a
substantial likelihood the person's release would result in great bod-
ily harm to others."81 Yet, in other states expanded categories of
defendants may be detained outright despite the lack of a specific
reference to a public safety purpose.82
3. Danger References Contained in Provisions Discussing
Conditions of Release
Twenty jurisdictions make explicit reference to danger goals in
provisions discussing the use of alternative conditions of release be-
yond ROR or unsecured bail.83 Perhaps the most directly stated is
or mandatory release after a prison term. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(e) (1981 & Supp.
1985).
78 In Georgia, persons charged with murder, rape, armed robbery, arson, kidnap-
ping, burglary, air hijacking, perjury, drug-related offenses, and aggravated assault are
"not entitled to be released on bail." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1984)
(such defendants may be detained up to 10 days, then they may petition the Superior
Court for a hearing to have bail granted as a matter of the judge's "sound discretion").
See also MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15.
79 VA. CODE § 19.2-120 (1983).
80 ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 22(3).
81 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12(6). See supra note 22.
82 In Texas, judges may deny bail to persons charged with capital offenses and to the
following categories of persons: (1) persons charged with felonies that have two prior
felony convictions; (2) persons charged with felonies while on pretrial release in connec-
tion with felony charges; (3) persons having a previous felony conviction who are
charged with a felony involving the use of a weapon. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 11 a. See
also NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAw § 530.20 (McKinney 1984); NEv.
REV. STAT. § 178.487.
83 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (Supp. 1985); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1962); CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 16-4-111 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2101,-2105 (1974); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1981 & Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046 (West 1985); HA-
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the Florida law which instructs that the legislature intended to make
"the protection of the community from risk of physical harm to per-
sons .. . the primary consideration" at bail.8 4 The language of the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 has been adapted in several
states.8 5 The laws of the District of Columbia, Alaska, South Dakota,
as well as the new Federal law state a strong presumption favoring
release of all bailable defendants on ROR or unsecured bail, "unless
the officer determines that the release of the person will ... pose a
danger to other persons and the community."'8 6
In New Hampshire and Ohio, use of ROR or unsecured bail is
conditioned on whether a defendant's physical, mental or emotional
condition may pose a danger to himself or others.8 7 In Washington,
Hawaii and New Mexico, the judge may attach additional conditions
of release if the judge fears that there is a danger that the defendant
will commit a "serious crime" if released.88 Under a statute ruled
invalid by the Hawaii Supreme Court on other grounds, Hawaii
judges may deny release altogether on that finding alone.8 9 In
WAIi REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-10(b) (Supp.
1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:6-a (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(b), -534.1
(1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-43-2 (1979 & Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(a) (1974);
Wis. STAT. §§ 969.01 to .035 (1985); MD. RULES CRIM. PROC. 4-216; MINN. RULES CRIM.
PROC. 6.02; N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22(c); OHIO RULES CRIM. PROC. 46; PA. RULES
CRIM. PROC. 4003; WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2(c).
84 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(1) (West 1985). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046
(West 1985), which states, in discussing conditions of release, that the "purpose of a bail
determination ... is to insure the appearance of the criminal defendant ... and to
protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant."
85 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (1966) origi-
nally codified 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966); repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, tit. II, ch. 1, §203(a), 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
86 ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1962); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1981 & Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-43-2 (1979 & Supp. 1985). Also similar to the
wording of the Bail Reform Act are the laws in Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota and Ver-
mont. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(b) (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2101, 2105
(1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-10(b) (1980 & Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13
§ 7554(a) (1974); MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC. 6.02.
87 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:6-a (1974); OHIO RULES CRIM. PROC. 46.
88 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (Supp. 1984); N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. § 22(c);
WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES § 3.2(c).
89 See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (Supp. 1984). In 1978, 1980 and 1981, the Ha-
waii legislature revised the statutes governing bail and pretrial detention to incorporate
danger concerns in both an expansion of pretrial detention and the addition of condi-
tions of release (HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 804-3, -7.1 (1976 & Supp. 1984). In Huihui v.
Shimoda, 64 Hawaii 527, 644 P. 2d 968 (1982), the Hawaii Supreme Court struck down
the statute based principally on the grounds that the Hawaii statute "exceeds the bounds
of reasonableness and due process by conclusively presuming a defendant's dangerous-
ness from the fact that he had been charged previously with a serious crime and pres-
ently with a felony, and by leaving no discretion in the trial judge to allow bail based on
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Pennsylvania and Colorado, consideration of conditions of release
beyond ROR is tempered by the same concern, expressed as a dan-
ger that the defendant will inflict "immediate physical" 90 or "immi-
nent bodily" harm to himself or others. 9 1 In Wisconsin, the concern
in weighing more restrictive options is the risk of "serious bodily
harm." 92 In the provisions discussing the use of conditions of re-
lease in several states are allusions to preventing defendants from
interfering with the administration of justice and to protecting wit-
nesses and jurors from intimidation. 93
4. Danger References Contained in Provisions Discussing Specific Factors
To Be Considered in Fixing Bail or Conditions
The final source of references to defendant danger or public
safety purposes for bail and pretrial detention in the new laws is
found in provisions that instruct judges to weigh specific factors in
selecting the particular conditions of release or, if cash bail is to be
set, the amount of bail to be imposed. Explicit reference to a dan-
ger orientation in these kinds of provisions is rare. The Florida stat-
ute advises the judge that "when determining whether to release a
defendant on bail or other conditions, and what that bail or those
other conditions may be, the court shall consider," among other fac-
tors, "the nature and probability of danger which the defendant's
other factors which may be directly relevant to a determination of the likelihood of the
defendant's committing other crimes." Id. at 543, 644 P.2d at 978. The Hawaii
Supreme Court thus found the statute invalid on due process grounds holding that the
Hawaii Constitution "prohibiting excessive bail, also protects persons accused of crimes
from unreasonable or arbitrary denial of bail." Id. at 539, 644 P.20 at 976. The court
agreed with the general public safety aims of the law ("we believe that this state has a
legitimate interest in protecting its communities from those who threaten their welfare,
and that this interest may be taken into account in the setting of pretrial bail." Id. at
542, 644 P.2d at 978) and did not attack the statute's other provisions that permitted
outright detention or the application of additional conditions of release in line with the
danger concern. The other provisions allow detention of (1) persons charged with an
offense punishable by life imprisonment without parole; (2) persons who have previ-
ously been convicted of a serious crime within the last 10 years; and (3) persons who at
the time of bail on a current charge are already on parole. Hawaii law also permits the
judge to detain a person, or set additional conditions, upon a showing that "there exists
a danger that the defendant will commit a serious crime or will seek to initimidate wit-
nesses, or will otherwise unlawfully interfere with the orderly administration ofjustice."
HAWAII REV. STAT. §804-7.1 (Supp. 1984). It is uncertain whether the entire Hawaii
statute, or merely the provision dealing with denial of bail to persons charged with felo-
nies already on pretrial release, has been held invalid.
90 PA. RULES CRIM. PROC. 4003.
91 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-111 (1973).
92 Wis. STAT. §§ 969.01 to .035 (1985).
93 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-10(b) (1980 & Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
534(b) (1983); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2(c) (1980); Wis. STAT. §§ 969.01 to.
035 (1985) N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22(c).
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release poses to the community."'94 Delaware's bail statute is similar
because it requires that in determining the amount of bail, judges
should set "such bail as reasonably will assure... the safety of the
community." 95 The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 quite explic-
itly asks the judicial officer to consider "the nature and seriousness
of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed
by the person's release." 96
Though not directly expressed, the danger aims of bail are
clearly implied by provisions in the statutes of other states. 97 In Ar-
kansas, Colorado and Oregon, the judge is instructed to decide bail
by taking into account "any facts indicating the possibility of viola-
tions of law if the defendant is released without restrictions." 98
Although its statutes are framed overall in terms relating to assuring
the appearance of defendants at court, Kentucky law nevertheless
manifests a concern for danger in instructing judges in considering
the amount of cash bail to weigh "the past criminal acts and the
reasonably anticipated conduct of the defendant if released." 99 In
pronounced contrast, although danger is an appropriate focus in
setting conditions of release under the new Federal law, in the Dis-
trict of Columbia and in Wisconsin, 00 those laws strictly prohibit
danger-related factors from entering into selection by judges of the
cash bail option. 10 '
94 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046(2)(e) (West 1985).
95 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2107 (1974).
96 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(g)(4) (Supp. 1985).
97 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-105() (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. 23 § 1321(b) (1981 &
Supp. 1985) (note that cash bail may not be employed to respond to danger concerns in
the District of Columbia); ALA. RULES Sup. CT. 22; ARK. RULES CRIM. PROC. 8.5; COLO.
RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(4)J); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.525(d) (1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 135.230(6)(g) (1983).
98 ARK. RULES CRIM. PROC. § 8.5; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-105G) (1973); OR. REV.
STAT. § 135.230(6)(g) (1983); see also STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra
note 7, at Standard 10-4.5(c)(vii); but see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES
AGENCIES, supra note 9 (Standard III deletes such a criterion). Colorado includes the
added consideration of "any facts indicating likelihood that there will be intimidation or
harassment of possible witnesses by the defendant." COLO. RULES CRIM. PROC.
46(4)(K).
99 Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.525(d) (1985).
100 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c) (Supp. 1985); Wis. CONST. art. I, §8; D.C. CODE ANN. 23
§ 1321 (1981 & Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. §§ 969.01(4), .02 (1985).
101 In concluding discussion of the kinds of provisions serving as sources of danger
references in bail laws, it is important to point out another kind of provision. Arguably,
there are public safety concerns in the state statutes which contain "mandatory condi-
tions of release" that require the defendants to observe "good behavior" or refrain from
committing crimes. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(h) (Supp. 1985); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3967(D) (1978); CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 1318 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 21-2108 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1980 & Supp.
1985); IND. CODE § 35-33-8-5 (Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (1980
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5. Eligibility for Restrictive Bail or Pretrial Detention
Not only do laws governing bail and pretrial detention in the
United States differ in how explicitly they address pretrial danger
concerns, in how they delimit those concerns, and in the kinds of
provisions they employ to present them, they display great variation
as well in the criteria they invoke to define the eligibility of defend-
ants for more restrictive bail options or for pretrial detention based
on some notion of anticipated danger. Despite the variety of ap-
proaches, 10 2 clear themes do emerge among the criteria defining
"dangerous" candidates. Several patterns of criteria defining eligi-
bility are noteworthy: 10 3 (1) eligibility tied to the nature of the
charged offense (other than murder) as the sole criterion; (2) eligi-
bility based on the defendant's current charge and past record of
convictions; (3) eligibility based on the current charge and whether
the defendant was on probation, parole, or mandatory release at the
time of arrest; (4) eligibility based on the current charge and
whether the defendant was on pretrial release for a previous charge
at the time of arrest; (5) eligibility based on threats or likely threats
posed by the defendant to witnesses or jurors; and (6) eligibility de-
riving from assessments of risk of the danger posed by a defendant.
Contrary to the criticisms of bail practices by reform advocates
of the 1960's that bail decisions should not rely primarily on the seri-
ousness of the current charge to determine likely risk,'0 4 the
& Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178-487 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 135-250 (1981); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4956 (Purdon); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1983), VA. CODE § 19.2-135 (1950); Wis. STAT. § 969.02 (1985); ARIZ. RULES
CRIM. PROC. § 7.3; R.I. RULES CRIM. PROC. § 46(2)(d). The requirement in CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-4-103 (1973), for example, that "further conditions of every bail bond shall
be that the released person not commit any felony while at liberty" may imply a bail
process oriented to preventing further serious crimes-a community protection purpose
similar to ones discussed above. In Colorado and other states these provisions serve
notice to a defendant obtaining pretrial release that commission of a crime during the
pretrial release period is grounds for revocation of release.
102 For a comprehensive analysis of the criteria employed in American jurisdictions
making defendants eligible for restrictive bail and pretrial detention, see Table 6 in the
Appendix.
103 Almost all jurisdictions have the traditional provision excluding defendants
charged with capital offenses (or in some instances, offenses punishable by life imprison-
ment) from a right to bail. It should be noted, however, that although this is true of the
states with danger laws, existence of such a provision is not in itself evidence of a danger
orientation. In fact, such exclusions from the right to bail exist in all non-danger states
as well. Taken with other kinds of danger references, however, they are a foundation for
the categorization of defendants who will be eligible for restrictive bail or pretrial deten-
tion. For that reason, Table 6 in the Appendix details these important provisions ac-
cording to whether or not bail may be denied for murder, treason or offenses punishable
by life imprisonment.
104 The criticisms of bail practices concerning the seriousness of the criminal charge
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predominant criterion for defining a defendant's eligibility for pre-
trial detention under the recent pretrial danger laws is the criminal
charge. Although rarely the sole eligibility criterion for pretrial de-
tention, it is the main criterion in many states. 10 5
Provisions combining current charges with a defendant's past
record of convictions as criteria for detention play a central role in
nine jurisdictions.10 6 The language varies markedly in these juris-
are: (1) bail based solely on criminal charge does not take into account many other
individual factors probably more related to bail risk; (2) bail based on criminal charge
leads to inequity (those with financial resources will be released, those without will not,
even though they may be charged with the same offenses). Recent research has shown
that despite years of bail reform, charge nevertheless remains the principal factor influ-
encing judges' bail decisions. SeeJ. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED, supra note 9;
J. GOLDKAMP & M. GOTrFREDSON, supra note 34; J. ROTH & P. WICE, supra note 34. De-
spite the hypothesized utility of community ties as better indicators of bail risk, predic-
tive studies have not demonstrated that either charge or community ties are more
strongly related to the concerns at bail of pretrial crime and defendant flight.
105 In three states, characteristics of the current charge serve as sufficient grounds for
detaining a defendant outright. In Michigan, persons charged with criminal sexual con-
duct in the first degree, armed robbery and kidnapping with the intent to extort are
detainable, in addition to those charged with murder or treason. MICH. CONsT. art. I,
§ 15. Under Wis. CONST. art. I, § 8, a judge may deny release prior to a bail hearing up
to 10 days to defendants charged with sexual assault that is punishable by a maximum
imprisonment of 20 years. The Nebraska constitution permits the direct detention of
persons charged with sex offenses "involving penetration by force or against the will of
the victim." NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
In 1978 Nebraska amended its constitution to add persons charged with "sexual
offenses involving penetration by force or against the will of the victim" to those
charged with murder and treason who could be denied bail outright. See Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981); Parker v. Roth,
202 Neb. 850, 278 N.W. 2d 106, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920 (1979). In Hunt, at the level of
the U.S. Court of Appeals, the amendment was held unconstitutional. Hunt, 648 F. 2d.
at 1164-165. The circuit court's decision in Hunt was later vacated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982), when it held the appeal decided by the
court of appeals moot, thus leaving for the time the question of the constitutionality of
the state's detention law open. Under the ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22[3], merely being
charged with a felony is sufficient for detention, if the judge at a hearing finds that the
defendant poses a "substantial danger," that no conditions of release will be sufficient,
and that the "proof is evident or the presumption great" on the present charge.
Alaska law, which also contains a strong presumption favoring release on ROR of
defendants, permits detention of up to 2 days of persons charged with felonies, if the
district attorney wishes to rebut the presumption that they should be released on ROR.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1980). The Texas constitution denies the right to bail to
persons charged with felonies involving a deadly weapon. TEx. CONST. art. I, § Ila. In
the District of Columbia defendants charged with crimes of violence who are suspected
of "being an addict" may be held for three days or longer. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1323
(1981 & Supp. 1985). In four states, special procedures allow for stringent conditions of
release or temporary detention of persons accused of crimes involving domestic vio-
lence. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025 (1980); MINN. STAT. § 629.72 (1983 & Supp. 1985);
N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAw §§ 530.12, .13 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(1983).
106 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142 (e),(f) (Supp. 1985); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 15; TEx. CoNsT. art. I, § 1 la; Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 8; D.C. CODE ANN.
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dictions.' 0 7 The states with the most general formulas are Texas108
and New York. 09 In these states, felony defendants with two prior
convictions for felonies may be detained before trial.
Fourteen jurisdictions include as a criterion for pretrial deten-
tion persons arrested for a current serious charge who are also on
pretrial release in connection with a previous serious charge."10
The courts have discussed the constitutionality of this criterion for
detention, basing detention as it does on two unproven crimes."'
Apparently several states view this merely as grounds for revocation
of pretrial release on the first charge that was conditioned on the
defendant's refraining from criminal activity."l 2
Statutes in only three jurisdictions specifically employ threats to
victims or witnesses as grounds for detaining a defendant,' 3
although a fourth indirectly incorporates the concern in its bail
law.' 14 The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 permits detention of a
defendant after a hearing if there exists "a serious risk that the per-
§ 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAW § 530.20 (McKinney
1984).
107 See Table 7 in the Appendix for different versions of these criteria.
108 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 1 la.
109 N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAW § 530.20 (McKinney 1984). Other states restrict their ex-
clusions to categories of defendants charged with and convicted of offenses designated
as "crimes of violence," "dangerous crimes," "serious crimes," "violent felonies," or
felonies involving "serious bodily harm." See Table 6 in the Appendix. A related ap-
proach in eight jurisdictions allows denial of pretrial release to persons charged with a
serious current offense and on probation, parole or mandatory release as a result of a
conviction for a previous serious offense. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (Supp. 1985); CoLo.
CONST. art. II, § 19; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp.
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1985); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1976
& Supp. 1984) (Parole only); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-33-8-5, -6 (West Supp. 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-20-1 (1982).
110 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (Supp. 1985); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19; MICH. CONST. art.
I, § 15; TEx. CONST. art. I, § lla; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3967 (1978); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1985);
HAWAu REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-6 (1980 &
Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616 (1957 & Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 276, § 58 (1980 & Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.487 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-20-1 (1982 & Supp. 1985); ARK. RULES CRIM. PROC. 9.6; MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC.
6.03.
111 For a discussion of the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court see supra note 89.
See also U.S. v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1022 (1982) (approves of the constitutionality of the District of Columbia law which
includes such a criterion).
112 See, e.g., the provisions cited supra note 110, for Arkansas, Massachusetts, Illinois
and Nevada.
113 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f)(2)(b) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12(c); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-1322(a)(3) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
114 ALA.JUD. AD. RULES 2.
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son will ... threaten, injure or intimidate... a prospective witness
or juror."" 15 In the District of Columbia, the judge may order the
detention of a person "charged with any offense if such person, for
the purpose of obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice, threat-
ens, injures, intimidates.., any prospective witness orjuror." 1 6 In
California a person charged with a felony offense may be denied
release if the person "has threatened another with great bodily
harm" and if "there is a substantial likelihood that the person would
carry out the threat if released." 1 7
6. Legal Standards for Bail and Detention Based on Danger: Conclusion
Applying the von Hirsch criterion that "there must be reason-
ably precise legal standards of dangerousness" as a yardstick, cur-
rent bail and detention laws are inadequate. More than one-fourth
of the laws that have danger-oriented provisions make no explicit
reference to dangerousness or public safety concerns." 8 Jurisdic-
tions where pretrial danger is referred to explicitly use a variety of
definitions of the anticipated future conduct as well as of criteria
qualifying defendants for pretrial detention or for more onerous
bail options. These definitions in many instances are vague, often
including only mention of such generalities as the "safety of the
community," or "danger to the public," or "danger to any other
person or the community." In many of the recent laws not only are
the definitions of danger vague, thus making it difficult for a person
to avoid the proscribed behavior, but they are overbroad as well,
with such wide latitude in their definitions that many kinds of de-
fendants might be considered dangerous for different reasons. 1" 9
Although vague pretrial danger laws may lend themselves too flexi-
bly to the detention of many categories of defendants, specificity in
their designation of classes of detainable defendants does not auto-
matically remedy the problems of vagueness. One of the most spe-
"15 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (Supp. 1985).
116 D.C. CODE ANN. 23 § 1322(a)(3) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
117 CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 12(c). The criterion of risk is incorporated explicitly in the
laws of 27 of the jurisdictions. Risk-variously formulated-constitutes not only a part
of the definition of the legal standard governing the use of danger-oriented bail and
detention, but is a major issue in itself; therefore this Article will examine risk in detail in
the subsequent section.
118 Of the 36 jurisdictions classified as having danger-oriented bail and/or pretrial
detention provisions, 10 do not explicitly mention danger concerns. These states are
Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Texas
and Utah. See the discussion in supra note 62.
119 For a discussion of these and related issues generally as applied to a juvenile pre-




cific statutes, the preventive detention code in the District of
Columbia, has been criticized by commentators for being overly in-
clusive, based on categories of defendants not reasonably
considered "dangerous." 120
The avoidability issue in preventive detention is a difficult one
to rationalize, revolving as it does around questions about the
vagueness of definitions of pretrial danger and about the specificity
of criteria triggering the application of pretrial detention. It is diffi-
cult because "avoidability" usually refers to notice that commission
of certain acts will be punished as crimes. As a recent court of ap-
peals decision has stated: "[c]hallenges to federal statutes on the
ground of vagueness rest on the principle that a person should be
free to plan his or her behavior based upon laws which are clear
enough to afford one a reasonable opportunity to know what is per-
mitted and what is proscribed." 12 1
The concept of avoidability strains as an evaluative criterion for
prevention detention measures, however, because pretrial danger
measures do not deprive an individual of liberty as a result of a de-
termination that the person committed a punishable act. Rather,
they detain on the basis of some anticipated harm, some future act
that is only generally defined and which can never be tested (be-
cause when a defendant is confined, the opportunity to pose the an-
ticipated danger is removed). Thus, in an important sense, these
dangers are by definition unavoidable because they are unfalsifiable.
Assurances that categories of defendants eligible for pretrial
detention have been narrowly and specifically drawn do not resolve
vagueness questions as they relate to definitions of pretrial danger.
In fact they are descriptions of defendants not definitions of the
feared acts. One court has resolved this conceptual dilemma as it
relates to challenges of the new Federal act by ruling that because
"[t]he new bail statute does not prohibit conduct" but "rather es-
tablishes a framework for a judge to detain an individual based on
prediction of possible future conduct . . . . A vagueness claim is
therefore not appropriate..."122
120 See generally Angel, Green, Kaufman & Van Loon, Preventive Detention: An Enpirical
Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 300 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Angel, Preventive De-
tention]; Greenberg & von Hirsch, Detention of Accused Offenders Before Trial, Staff Memoran-
dum, The Committee for the Study of Incarceration, at 10 (April, 1973); von Hirsch,
supra note 59.
121 Textile Pension Workers Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co. Inc., 725 F.2d
843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984).
122 United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), revd, 759 F.2d
202 (2d Cir. 1985).
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B. ASSESSMENT OF RISK IN BAIL AND ITS VALIDITY
AS AN ELIGIBILITY CRITERION
1. The Role of Risk Assessment
Prediction of the likelihood of certain conduct necessarily involves a
margin of error, but it is an established component of our pretrial re-
lease system.1 23
In von Hirsch's criticism of preventive confinement, he notes
that seldom has the accuracy of dangerousness predictions in the
mental health or corrections fields been systematically tested to
throw light on the utility of screening procedures. 24 In the past few
decades, bail and pretrial detention practices aimed at public safety
concerns have been derided because of the many problems that
characterize such predictive decisions in which loss of liberty is the
possible result. Senator Ervin criticized preventive detention on the
grounds that "[ilt imprisons for unproved, anticipated crime, rather
than actual criminal conduct."' 25 From one perspective, the charge-
related criteria rendering defendants eligible for pretrial detention
in the laws may reflect legislative efforts to define eligibility for pre-
trial or preventive detention using "objective" indicators of the risk
of danger. According to that perspective, these laws represent pro-
gress away from the standardless detention practices associated with
the use of cash bail and toward explicit decisionmaking criteria. Yet,
if bail and the resulting detention serve primarily predictive ends,
and not questionable punitive goals, questions may be raised not
only from a legal, but also from a social science perspective about
the appropriateness of such approaches to pretrial detention. First,
research has not demonstrated that charge-related criteria such as
those contained in recent laws are the best, or even good, predictors
of anticipated dangers.' 26 Second, such approaches do not address
123 United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1342.
124 von Hirsch, supra note 59, at 726. For a discussion of the prediction of dangerous-
ness in the mental health field, see J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN
ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES (1981).
125 Ervin, supra note 16, at 298; see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES
AGENCIES, supra note 9; STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 7; A.B.A.,
Pretrial Release, supra note 31; Dershowitz, supra note 16; Foote, Compelling Appearance in
Court, supra note 16.
126 S. CLARKE, J. FREEMAN & G. KOCH, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAIL SYSTEMS: AN
ANALYSIS OF FAILURE-TO-APPEAR IN COURT AND REARREST WHILE ON BAIL 2-4 (1976); J.
GOLDKAMP, M. GOTrFREDSON & S. MITCHELL-HERZFELD, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF COR-
RECTIONS, A STUDY OF POLICY GUIDELINES (1981) [hereinafter cited asJ. GOLDKAMP, BAIL
DECISIONMAKING]; Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120; Gottfredson, An Empirical
Analysis of Pretrial Release Decisions, 2J. CRIM. JUST. 287, 289 (1974); M. Freeley &J. Mac-




the sizeable margins of error associated with detention caused by
their use. 127
The difficulties associated with predictive decisions notwith-
standing, prediction of future danger is an unavoidable reality in
bail: it has not only been practiced traditionally by judges at their
discretion, but has been institutionalized in many of the recent laws.
In twenty-seven of the thirty-six jurisdictions having danger or pub-
lic safety orientations, laws require judges to distinguish dangerous
defendants by assessments of the risk of danger, often through ex-
ceedingly vague instructions. 128
The likely success of risk assessment depends first on the speci-
ficity of the definition of danger in the statute. In some instances
the judge is required merely to gauge whether the release of a de-
fendant will "pose a danger to the community" or to "any other
person," while in others the assessment must be of the risk of "im-
minent bodily harm," "physical harm," "serious crime" or even
"any felony."1 29 A second reason for the difficulty in assessing dan-
ger is the level of risk: for example, some states ask the judge to
discern merely that the defendant may pose "a danger"; in others,
the judge must forecast a "substantial danger," a "significant peril,"
or an "unreasonable danger."' 3 0
127 See Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120. See generally M. GOTrFREDSON & D.
GOTrFREDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE
OF DISCRETION 7-17 (1980); Underwood, Law and the Grystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
128 Table 8 in the Appendix is a compilation of the statutory language that asks the
judge to assess the likely danger in conditioning the granting of ROR, fixing cash bail, or
detaining defendants outright. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141, 3142 (Supp. 1985); ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 22(3); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 14; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. 13 § 3961 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-4-111, -106 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 2101,2105,2107 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321,-1322,-1323 (1981 & Supp.
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901(c)(1) to (c)(4)
(1983 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 110-10 (1980 & Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.525 (1981); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (1972 & Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597(6)(a) (1974);
N.C. GEN. STAT. 26 §§ 15A-534, -534.1 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.230( 6 )(g) (1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-43-2 (1979 & Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 229, § 7554(b) (1974); VA.
CODE § 19.2-120 (1983); ARK. RULES CRIM. PROC. 8.5; COLO. RULES CRIM. PROC.
46(4)(j); MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC. 6.02; N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22(c); OHIO RULES
CRIM PROC. 46; PA. RULES CRIM. PROC. 4003; WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2(c).
129 See supra discussion of Table 4 in text accompanying note 62.
130 Id. In other areas of law where the liberty interests of an individual are at stake,
such as civil commitment, the constitutionality of commitment procedures has hinged
on examination of the two underlying dimensions of risk assessment. For example, in
invalidating a District of Columbia sexual psychopath commitment statute, Judge
Bazelon wrote that both the "magnitude" and the "likelihood of harm" must be mea-
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Laws rarely instruct the judge making these assessments of
likely danger how to measure such risk.131 In several states, the de-
fendant's eligibility for detention or more onerous bail is based on
the judge's assessment of likely danger as tied to a current charge
criterion.13 2 In Arizona, the predictive danger assessments combine
with a charge criterion to permit pretrial detention when a defend-
ant is charged with a felony and the judge determines that the de-
fendant "poses a substantial danger to any other person or the
community" and that "no conditions of release ... will reasonably
assure the safety of the other person or the community," the de-
fendant may be detained.1 33
In other jurisdictions, assessments by the judge that the defend-
ant represents a danger may be the overriding factor in assigning
more onerous conditions of release which may result in deten-
tion134, even though danger is only vaguely defined and statutes of-
fer the judge no tools for classifying defendants according to their
relative risk. Surprisingly, in Virginia the assessment of danger is
the sole criterion for determining whether the defendant may be re-
leased on bail or may be detained directly.1 35 Similarly, in Hawaii
the judge may deny the defendant release before trial "[u]pon a
showing that there exists a danger that the defendant will commit a
serious crime or will seek to intimidate witnesses, or will otherwise
unlawfully interfere with the orderly administration of justice
"136
sured in determining "preventive detention" of another sort. Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d
1095, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1969). California's constitution unusually combines a compara-
tively specific definition of danger with a relatively great level of certainty in the assess-
ment in its detention provision, in requiring "a substantial likelihood" that a "person's
release would result in great bodily harm to others." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
131 Massachusetts is unusual because its law advises the judge how to assess danger.
The law states that the judge should weigh the gravity, nature and circumstances of the
offenses charged, the prisoner's record of convictions, if any, and whether said charges
or convictions are for offenses involving the use or threat of physical force or violence
against any person, whether the person is on probation, parole or other release pending
completion of sentence for any conviction.... the prisoner's mental condition and any
illegal drug distribution or present drug dependency. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276,
§ 58 (1972 & Supp. 1985).
132 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22; CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 12; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 2105, 2107 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
133 ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 22.
134 More onerous "conditions" may include financial bail that is unaffordable to the
defendant and that, therefore, results in detention.
135 Va. Code § 19.2-120 (1983).
136 Hawaii Rev. Stat. 804-7.1 (1976 & Supp. 1984); see supra note 89.
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2. The Validity of Bail Predictions
Our cases indicate, however, that from a legal point of view there is
nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal
conduct. 13 7
Although a number of studies have examined the predictive as-
pects of bail and pretrial detention decisionmaking,138 direct evalua-
tion of the accuracy of danger assessments at bail is confounded by a
number of difficulties: (1) pretrial detention is often not a direct
decision but rather the indirect result of a cash bail decision; (2) the
factors actually influential in judges' decisions may correspond only
slightly with those recommended for consideration by law or with
those actually predictive of defendant misconduct; 139 and (3) only
rarely do laws instruct judges to consider specific factors or to em-
ploy specific conditions of release in assessing and addressing dan-
ger concerns as differentiated from appearance concerns.1 40
Despite these and other methodological difficulties, several
studies have attempted to predict crime committed by defendants
during pretrial release and have had marginal degrees of success. 141
Few of these have studied the predictive efficacy ofjudicial bail deci-
sions, and only rarely has a predictive scheme developed in such a
study been independently validated. 142 Although many jurisdic-
tions collect aggregate statistics describing rearrests of defendants
137 Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2417 (1984). See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 274 -75 (1976); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). The
Supreme Court does not express the view that judicial prediction must meet scientific
standards of accuracy. One recent Federal District Court decided a challenge to deten-
tion of a defendant under the Federal law on the basis of poor predictive powers by
relying on the dictum from Schall v. Martin. See United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp.
1442, 1451-52 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
138 See, e.g., S. CLARKE, supra note 126;J. GOLDEAMP & M. GOTrFREDSON, supra note 34;
J. LOCKE, R. PENN, R. RICK, BUNTEN & G. HARE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, TECH-
NICAL NOTE 535, COMPILATION AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-
TRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS: PILOT STUDY (1970) [hereinafter cited asJ. LOCKE, PILOT
STUDY]; J. ROTH & P. WICE, supra note 34; Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120;
Gottfredson, supra note 126; Toborg, Pretrial Release Assessment of Danger and Flight:
Method Makes a Difference (McClean, Va.: Lazar Institute, 1984); M. Feeley &J. McNaugh-
ton, supra note 126.
139 J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED, supra note 9; J. GOLDKAMP & M. GOTrF-
REDSON, supra note 34;J. ROTH AND P. WICE, supra note 34; Bock & Frazier, supra note 34;
Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 34.
140 The Massachusetts provision dealing with the revocation of pretrial release of a
defendant arrested on subsequent felony charges is a narrow, and only, exception. See
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (1972 & Supp. 1985). See also supra note 126.
141 See supra note 138.
142 See J. GOLDAMP & M. GOTrFREDSON, supra note 34; Angel, Preventive Detention,
supra note 120; Gottfredson, supra note 126. The study by Toborg, supra note 138, may
have employed validation, but evidence concerning validation is not presented.
[Vol. 76
BAIL REFORM
granted pretrial release, rarely have judges incorporated actuarial
information into their decisionmaking approaches or developed a
means for reviewing the success of their decisions for subsequent
modification of their approaches.1 43 Thus, while the von Hirsch
evaluative criterion calls for validation of the "predictive method"
used in bringing about the preventive confinement of dangerous in-
dividuals, in most jurisdictions there is no known "method" of pre-
diction in bail, much less a tested one. This rather dismal state of
the art in prediction of pretrial crime notwithstanding, the United
States Supreme Court has not been inclined to recognize the cen-
trality of these issues.1 44
C. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN DANGER RELATED
BAIL AND DETENTION
Pretrial detention requires a predictive judgment about future conduct
that depends on imperfect evaluative techniques. 145
[U]nbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently
a poor substitute for principle and procedure. 146
Among the many reservations expressed in the debate over pre-
ventive detention, a key concern has been the likelihood that "pre-
ventive" decisionmaking will be unconscionably error-prone. 47
Proponents of preventive detention laws have recommended incor-
porating sufficient due process safeguards as a partial remedy for
erroneously confining defendants. 48
Due process safeguards differ widely in several important re-
spects: (1) in the definition of criteria making defendants eligible
143 J. GOLDKAMP & GOTrFREDSON, supra note 34.
144 See supra note 137.
145 See United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1356 (Ferren, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
146 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
147 See, e.g., Angel, Prevention Detention, supra note 120; Dershowitz, supra note 16; Er-
vin, supra note 16; Preventive Detention Hearings, supra note 19. But see Schall v. Martin, 104
S. Ct. 2403, 2417-19 (1984) (majority finds post detention due process reviews sufficient
to compensate for possible errors).
148 See STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 7, at 696-70 1; NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, supra note 9, at 35-49; A.B.A., Pretrial Re-
lease, supra note 31, at 40-49; Task Force on Crime, supra note 61, at 11-13. See also United
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 740-61 (the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found
the procedures under the District of Columbia law sufficient.) But see also the dissents by
Associate Judge Ferren who recommended more stringent safeguards, 430 A.2d at
1350-61 (Ferren,J., dissenting) and AssociateJudge Mack who viewed this classification
of dangerousness as arbitrary and invalid under due process and equal protection con-
cerns, 430 A.2d at 1365-72 (MackJ, dissenting). See also Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Hawaii
527, 644 P.2d 968 (1982); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 198 1). See also Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
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for detention; (2) in the length of time that may pass before a de-
tained defendant must have a hearing to review custody; (3) in the
burden and level of proof that must be made by the court; and (4) in
the availability of "minimum requirements of due process" 1 49 at any
hearings. Of the thirty-six jurisdictions that have danger-related
pretrial laws, nearly half include neither routine hearings to decide
the defendant's eligibility for direct detention nor basic reviews of
the custody of defendants who have not raised cash bail and conse-
quently remain confined in their laws. 150
The law in the District of Columbia, which includes both kinds
of procedures, was the earliest comprehensive preventive detention
law.' 51 The law requires that a defendant whom the government
wishes to detain be brought before the judicial officer for a hearing
immediately after arrest.' 52 At the hearing to determine whether
the defendant will be detained, the defendant may be represented
by counsel, may cross examine and "present information by proffer
or otherwise," and may testify and present witnesses. 55 The "infor-
mation" offered by either party at the hearing does not under Dis-
trict of Columbia law need to conform to the rules governing the
admissibility of evidence at trial.' 54
To have the defendant detained, the U.S. Attorney must bear
the burden of proof on three issues: (1) that "there is clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person is a person" falling within the "dan-
gerous crime," "crime of violence," or intimidations provisions; 55
(2) that "there is no condition or combination of conditions of release which
will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community;" and
(3) in the case of the "dangerous crime" or "crime of violence" cat-
egories, that there is "a substantial probability that the person committed
149 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480-82 (1972).
150 The states with laws providing for no hearings or reviews are Alabama, Delaware,
Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Car-
olina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota and Virginia. See Table 9 in
the Appendix.
151 See United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1022 (1982); Bases & McDonald, Preventive Detention in the District of Columbia: The First
Ten Months (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure
and Vera Institute ofJustice 1972).
152 The hearing requirement may be postponed for three days if the government
requests a continuance or for up to five days if the defendant so requests. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
153 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
154 Id. at §23-1322(c)(5).
155 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1322(1) to (a)(3) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
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the offense for which he is present before the judicial officer." 156 In
detaining a defendant, under the District of Columbia laws, the
judge must issue an order containing written findings of fact. The
detained defendant has a right to appeal the decision1 57 and to have
the case placed on an "expedited calendar." 158
In the nineteen jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia
in which defendants may be detained directly, 159 eleven provide for
detention hearings in a variety of ways. 160 According to the tradi-
156 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1322(a), (b) (1981 & Supp. 1985). See United States v. Ed-
wards, 430 A.2d at 1350-65 (Ferren, J., dissenting), 1365-72 (Mack, J., dissenting).
157 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c)(7) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
158 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
159 See supra note 75. This discussion ignores the traditional practice of denying bail
in capital cases.
160 See Table 9 in the Appendix. In Arizona, for example, a defendant has the right to
a hearing to determine detention within twenty-four hours of initial appearance, to be
represented by counsel, and to present information in a fashion similar to the District of
Columbia provisions. For detention to be ordered, the court must find: (a) by "clear and
convincing evidence that the person charged poses a substantial danger to another person or the com-
munity;" (b) that "the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person committed the offense
for which he is charged;" and (c) that "no condition or combination of conditions of release may be
imposed which will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community." ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13:3961(B) (1978 & Supp. 1985). Evidence submitted for consideration
need not conform to the rules governing admissibility of evidence at trial. ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13:3967(H) (1978 & Supp. 1985).
Detained defendants are placed on "an expedited calendar consistent with the ad-
ministration ofjustice" according to Arizona statutes. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3961
(1978 & Supp. 1985).
Under new Colorado law, defendants who fall into the detainable categories are
entitled to a hearing within 96 hours at which the state must demonstrate (a) that the
"'proof is evident and the presumption is great" that the defendant committed the alleged offense and
(b) that "the public would be placed in significant peril if the accused were released on bail."
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19(b).
Wisconsin law provides for a detention hearing within 10 days at which the state
must prove (a) by "clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the current felony
offense;" and (b) that "available conditions of release will not adequately protect members of the
community from serious bodily harm or prevent the intimidation of witnesses." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 969.035(6) (1985). Unlike other states having detention hearings, Wisconsin law pro-
vides that the use of information at the hearing will conform to the rules of evidence
governing trial procedure. Wis. STAT. § 969.035(6)(c)(1985).
Texas law alludes to a hearing, stating that defendants falling within its categories
excluded from bail may have their detention continued beyond seven days "upon evi-
dence substantially showing the guilt of the accused." TEx. CONsT. art. I, § lla.
The Massachusetts detention proceeding is narrow in scope, framed as a revocation
of pretrial release proceeding, although along with revocation of release on the first
charge, the defendant may be detained as long as sixty days on the new charge. MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). At the hearing at which the
defendant may be represented by counsel, the court must find: (I) " 'probable cause to
believe' the defendant has committed a crime during pretrial release;" and (2) "in the exercise of
its discretion, whether the release of said prisoner will seriously endanger any person or the com-
munity." Id. The Massachusetts law requires the court to state the reasons for the find-
ing if detention results, and provides for an appeal procedure and requires that the
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tional formula denying the right to bail to defendants charged with
capital crimes when the proof is evident and the presumption is
great, the reviewing judge may grant bail upon a showing that guilt
is in doubt or that the proof is not evident and the presumption is
not great.16 1 In the three states that permit direct detention of de-
fendants through expansion of categories excluded from a right to
bail, although no hearing is required to cause the detention of the
eligible defendants in the first place, hearings with strict standards
are provided in instances when defendants detained under the pro-
visions may request release on bail. 162
In contrast with the danger-law states having hearings dealing
directly with the detention question, the laws of eleven jurisdictions
incorporate routine reviews of persons remaining in custody be-
cause the bail, "conditions of release," set could not be met.'6 3 In
"prisoner so held shall be brought to trial as soon as reasonably possible." Id. Illinois
law closely parallels Massachusetts' by specifying that persons arrested for "forcible
felonies" while already on pretrial release may be detained outright after a hearing in
open court and "upon a showing by the state the defendant did commit the forcible felony by clear
and convincing evidence." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-6 (1980 & Supp. 1985). But see
ARK. RULES CRIM. PROC. 9.6, in which a defendant committing a felony while on pretrial
release for any crime may have release revoked upon a finding in any court of probable
cause as to the new charges.
161 See, e.g., ARIZ. RULES CRIM. PROC. 7.2(b).
162 The Michigan constitution provides that persons charged with crimes in one of the
excluded categories (criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, armed robbery, and
kidnapping with intent to extort) may petition the court for release and then the judge
may consider bailing them only if the judge finds that the defendant is "not likely to flee
or present a danger to any other person." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15. In Utah, persons
excluded by the constitution from a right to bail may achieve release at the discretion of
the court "after hearing and finding that the interests ofjustice do not require detention
without bail." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1 (1982). In Georgia, defendants in the many
categories excluded from a right to bail may petition the court within ten days for bail.
The court may set bail only if it finds the following: (1) "no significant risk of fleeing;"
(2) "no significant threat or danger to any person or to the community or to property
within the community;" (3) "no significant risk of committing any felony pending trial;"
and 4) "no significant risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the admin-
istration ofjustice." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-901 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
163 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.30.020(d) to .020(g) (1962 & Supp. 1983); CAL. [PENAL]
CODE § 1271 (Deering 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-105(2) (1973); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1321(d) (1981 & Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.132 (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 431.520(6) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.03 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245
(1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(d) (1974); Ky. RULES CRIM. PROC. 14.38; N.M.
[RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22(c),(d),(e); N.D. RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(a)(iii) - (1)(vii).
The requirement to review the custody of defendants held under conditions they
were unable to meet stems not so much from the public safety impetus to revise bail and
pretrial detention laws as from the general effort of bail reform and its model legislation,
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. The laws of other non-danger law states provide
for similar reviews. See IOWA CODE § 811.2 (1979 & Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:2802(6) (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 942(3) (1964); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 544.455(l) (1957 & Supp. 1985); Wyo. RULES CRIM. PROC. 8(2).
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Florida, all defendants held for seventy-two hours have a right to a
"nonadversarial probable cause hearing" at which they do not need
to be present to have detention reviewed. Neither findings concern-
ing flight risk nor danger are involved in the hearing.164 In sixjuris-
dictions and the District of Columbia, the language of the Federal
Bail Reform Act of 1966 is adopted almost verbatim.' 65 In these
states within twenty-four or forty-eight hours, depending on the ju-
risdiction, 166 a defendant remaining in custody is entitled to a re-
view of the conditions of release set by the original judge before the
same or another judicial officer. These jurisdictions require a writ-
ten statement of the original conditions of release and, if the review-
ing judge does not choose to alter the original conditions, written
reasons for the conditions holding the defendant. The procedural
requirements for this review are unclear in these jurisdictions, but
no formal requirements are stated explicitly .167
D. MINIMAL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN DANGER-RELATED BAIL AND
DETENTION: CONCLUSION
There is dearly considerable unevenness in the availability of
due process safeguards for eligible defendants (von Hirsch's third
critical theme in the evaluation of preventive confinement proce-
dures). For example, this Article documents that nearly half of the
jurisdictions fail to provide for either full hearings for determining
pretrial detention or for reviews of custody resulting from cash bail
decisions. Among jurisdictions with some form of hearing or re-
164 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.132 (West 1985). This hearing only reviews whether there
is probable cause to believe the detained defendant committed the offense charged. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
165 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146(d) (Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.30.020(d) to 0 2 0(g)
(1962); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23 § 1321(d) (1981 & Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 431.520(6) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.03 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7554(d) (1974); N.M. [RULES] CRIM. PROC. 22; N.D. RULES CRIM. PROC. 46(a)(1)(iii)-
(vii).
166 In the District of Columbia, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico and Vermont, the
review of the conditions causing the detention of defendants must occur within 24
hours; in Alaska and North Dakota, the reviews may occur within 48 hours of initial
custody. See supra note 165.
167 Although a bail hearing is not provided for in Alaska statutory law, case law pro-
vides that defendants have a right to a hearing and to confront witnesses regarding the
amount of bail or the terms and conditions of bail. Carman v. State, 564 P.2d 361
(Alaska 1977). In Colorado, detained defendants may petition for a 48 hour review of
the conditions set that cause them to be held, but the reviewing judge may "summarily
deny" the petition or "promptly conduct a hearing." COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-105(2)
(1983). In California, detained defendants are entitled to an automatic review of the
"order fixing the amount of bail" within three days of the initial bail decision, although




view, there is a great diversity in the safeguards available to the de-
fendant, the standards of evidence and the formality of the
proceedings. In certain instances, little was required of the judge
reviewing the detention question and few rights were afforded the
defendant; in other instances, rather a full range of protections were
afforded, including full adversarial proceedings, demanding eviden-
tiary requirements and standards for findings of dangerousness,
written explanations for the findings, appeals procedures and expe-
dited calendars for defendants remaining in detention. A number
of states provide both detention hearings for defendants directly
detainable and review procedures for defendants remaining in cus-
tody after "normal" bail procedures. 168
Despite the handful ofjurisdictions with fully developed proce-
dural safeguards-such as the Federal jurisdiction, the District of
Columbia, Wisconsin and Massachusetts-generally danger-related
uses of pretrial detention and bail have expanded in the United
States, while due process safeguards for defendants eligible for such
measures have not.
Yet, even if all jurisdictions had due process provisions in their
current danger statutes, difficult questions about what are the ideal
procedural safeguards nevertheless would remain. Evaluation of
the sufficiency of procedural requirements is linked inexorably to
resolution of the substantive issues at the heart of pretrial release
and detention practice-precisely the issues framed by von Hirsch
in focusing on legal standards of dangerousness and the validity of
its prediction. The question of whether the elaboration of some
"minimum due process" at the bail or detention stage
counterbalances the freer access to outright pretrial detention of de-
fendants viewed as dangerous is made more difficult by the knowl-
edge that full review of detention decisions-even in jurisdictions
observing a full complement of procedural safeguards-may not be
available until already made moot by the passage of the pretrial pe-
riod during which the defendant has remained confined.
IV. THE ARRIVAL OF FEDERAL PREVENTIVE DETENTION
If critics' doubts about the legitimacy of a public safety orienta-
tion in bail decisionmaking or about the constitutionality of laws
permitting direct detention of persons on the basis of estimates of
danger had not been resolved earlier, they must have been substan-
tially put to rest during 1984. In that year, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a contested juvenile
168 See Table 9 in the Appendix.
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detention statute in New York in Schall v. Martin1 69 and Congress
enacted the Federal law permitting pretrial detention on the basis of
pretrial danger or flight.
A. THE MESSAGE OF SCHALL V. MARTIN
In Martin the Court reviewed the New York juvenile detention
law permitting preventive detention on the basis of anticipated fu-
ture crime to determine whether it was compatible with "fundamen-
tal fairness required by due process," whether within the context of
the juvenile justice system such detention served a "legitimate state
objective" and whether the procedural safeguards contained in the
act were "adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least
some juveniles charged with crimes."' 170 Although the Court's hold-
ing that a legitimate interest of the state was being served and that
the due process provided for was adequate, and while it was limited
to juvenile proceedings and tied to parens patriae questions, there
were strong clues concerning the Supreme Court's likely evaluation
of preventive detention in the adult sphere.
Building on its finding in Bell v. Wolfish that pretrial detention
designed to assure a defendant's appearance in court serves a legiti-
mate regulatory function and is not tantamount to punishment, 17'
the Supreme Court in Martin offered unequivocal support to the
community protection aims of detention decisions in writing:
The 'legitimate and compelling state interest' in protecting the com-
munity from crime cannot be doubted 172.... We have stressed before
that crime prevention is a weighty social objective and this interest
persists undiluted in the juvenile context. 173
The substantiality and legitimacy of the state interests underlying this
statute are confirmed by the widespread use and judicial acceptance of
preventive detention for juveniles. 174
In light of the uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention of
juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juve-
nile, we conclude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory pur-
pose compatible with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded by the Due
Process Clause in juvenile proceedings. 175
Preventive detention under the Family Court Act serves as the legiti-
matc state objective, held in common with every state in the country,
of both protecting both the juvenile and society from the hazards of
169 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2417-18 (1984).
170 Id. at 2410.
171 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-38 (1979).
172 Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 2411.




Martin suggests that the Supreme Court would have little con-
ceptual difficulty in accepting preventive detention in the adult sys-
tem aimed at community protection, because of the importance it
has placed on crime prevention as a social objective, because of its
widespread use and judicial acceptance, and/or in light of the uni-
form legislative judgment that pretrial detention of adults promotes
a compelling state interest.
Not only did the Martin court find little difficulty with the dan-
ger agenda in juvenile detention as found in the New York statute or
with the danger defined therein, 77 it rejected the argument that
prediction of dangerous juveniles was likely to be so error-prone
that preventive detention should be held unconstitutional on due
process or equal protection grounds:
But appellees claim, and the district court agreed, that it is virtually
impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accu-
racy. Moreover, they say the statutory standard fails to channel the
discretion of the Family Court judge by specifying the factors on which
he should rely in making that prediction. The procedural protections
... are thus, in their view, unavailing because the ultimate decision is
intrinsically arbitrary and uncontrolled. Our cases indicate, however,
that from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable
about prediction of future criminal conduct. .. and we have specifi-
cally rejected the contention... 'that it is impossible to predict future
behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.'
We have also recognized that a prediction of future criminal conduct is
'an experienced prediction based on a host of variables' which cannot
be readily codified.' 78
In reviewing the due process safeguards available to the juve-
nile under the New York statute, the Supreme Court noted that they
exceeded what were minimally necessary under Gerstein v. Pugh.179
By applying the Gerstein standard, as opposed to those outlined for
parole revocation in Morrissey v. Brewer,'80 the Supreme Court may
be revealing how it would review existing adult detention statutes
for due process. That the Court viewed these procedures as suffi-
176 Id. at 2415.
177 The Court described the danger in New York as a serious risk that the child may
commit an act before the return date which if committed by an adult would constitute a
crime. Id. at 2417.
178 Id. at 2417-18.
179 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975). The New York minimum require-
ments included notice of the charges, two hearings, access to and counsel representation
by counsel, an opportunity to offer testimony and to call witnesses, a determination (at
the second hearing) of probable cause that the juvenile committed the alleged offense
and a written statement of reasons for the detention of the juvenile.
180 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See U.S. v. Delker 757 F.2d 1390 (3d Cir. 1985).
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cient, taken with the fact that detention would be for a limited per-
iod of time and that review of detention was readily available "for
correcting on a case-by-case basis any erroneous detentions,"1 8 1
may be an additional signal that jurisdictions providing an
equivalent level of due process at the detention stage in the adult
system might not be faulted.
B. KEY FEATURES OF THE FEDERAL BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
That Congress has overcome its reluctance to address preven-
tive detention issues in passing the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
is fundamentally important in helping civil libertarians determine
how questions concerning the constitutionality of pretrial detention
based on defendant dangerousness will be decided. This Article will
briefly review the features of the new Federal law, highlight the lat-
est orthodoxy pertaining to danger concerns in pretrial release and
detention decisionmaking and illustrate how Congress has ad-
dressed some of these issues. In a fashion closely derivative of the
District of Columbia prototype, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
made public safety a central concern in the judicial officer's choice
between four pretrial custody options: (1) release of the defendant
directly on a written promise to appear and to refrain from crime;
(2) release of the defendant with certain conditions imposed; (3)
temporary detention in specific circumstances; and (4) outright pre-
trial detention for a period of up to seventy days.
1. The Presumption Favoring ROR and Release Under
Least Restrictive Conditions
The initial presumption that defendants should be released on
personal recognizance survives from the Reform Act of 1966. In the
1984 revision, which follows the District of Columbia Model, how-
ever, public safety concerns also temper its granting: "unless [such
release] will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person...
or will endanger the safety of any other person or the commu-
nity."' 8 2 The law retains release under the least restrictive alterna-
tives as the central principle guiding the selection of release options
and the judicial officer is directed to choose an option "subject to
the least restrictive further conditions" after ROR, "or combination
of conditions, that he determines will reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the person ... and the safety of any other person and the
181 Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2419.
182 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(b) (Supp. 1985).
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community."' 8 3 Certainly, the Federal law provides a list of condi-
tions for the judge's consideration that is both lengthier and more
diverse than those of other laws.
2. Elimination of Cash Bail as a Means for Detaining Defendants
The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 moves beyond the laws in
the District of Columbia and Wisconsin, 84 the only two jurisdic-
tions to restrict the use of cash bail from danger applications, in
prohibiting use of financial bail to detain defendants: "[t]hejudicial
officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pre-
trial detention of the person."' 85 Theoretically at least, this innova-
tion might have a more profound impact on the bail system in the
United States than any other feature of the act because the tradi-
tional, sub rosa means for securing pretrial detention could well be
abrogated.
The bail decision under this model becomes an unmuddied
choice for the judicial officer between granting the defendant pre-
trial liberty or confinement. In contrast to traditional cash-based
detention practices which leave the judge's intention concerning
custody disguised by the defendants' varying abilities to afford bail,
the Federal law would force an explicit detention versus release de-
cision: either the judge intends to release the defendant (and only
then has to decide under which conditions, if any) or the judge de-
cides to detain the defendant (either temporarily or for the seventy
day period allotted). Cash may only be applied as a condition of
release. This approach is different from other jurisdictions with for-
mal detention laws because the traditional cash system is not al-
lowed to co-exist with the new preventive detention procedures.
3. Pretrial Detention Decision
When the judge has determined that no conditions of release
will minimize the risk posed by a defendant to the safety of "any
other person or the community," the judge may detain the defend-
ant as long as certain eligibility criteria are met. In defining candi-
dacy for preventive detention based on danger, federal procedure
follows some of the patterns discussed earlier, including: (1) a
formula based on current charge and prior record criteria; (2) a cen-
tral role for predictive assessment of risk by the judicial officer; and
183 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c)(2) (Supp. 1985). See United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp.
1388, 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985).
184 See supra note 51.
185 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c) (Supp. 1985).
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(3) a full repertoire of procedures designed to make the conditions
of release and detention decisions based on danger fair and
reviewable. 186
Like several other jurisdictions, the new Federal law provides
the judge with the ability to detain defendants temporarily upon
finding that the individual was on pretrial release for a felony, on
release pending imposition of a sentence, or appeal, on probation
or parole, or is not a citizen and "the person may flee or pose a
danger to any other person or the community."' 187 The law does
not discuss the level of finding necessary to establish that the person
may flee or pose a danger. Also the judge may detain a defendant in
this instance without a hearing. 18 8 If the appropriate authorities
have not responded within the ten day period, the defendant will be
entitled to have release conditions set like any other defendant.
Extended pretrial detention may be invoked for three catego-
ries of defendants under the Federal Act:
a. those who fall within certain categories of current criminal
charges or of certain charges and prior convictions in combination
and for whom the judge finds that no conditions of release will as-
sure their appearance nor protect the community;'8 9
b. those for whom, because they fall within the same categories
and other factors apply, no presumption for release exists (a "rebut-
table presumption" arises that no condition of release will assure
their appearance or ensure the safety of the community); 90 and
c. those who a judge or United States Attorney shows pose "a
serious risk that the person will flee" or "a serious risk that the per-
son will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure,
or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate, a pro-
spective witness or juror."''
Like other jurisdictions, the eligibility of defendants in the first
and second categories for pretrial detention is based on a formula
using current charges and prior convictions: they are eligible if the
charge is for one of a number of "crimes of violence," if the charged
offenses are punishable by death or life imprisonment, if the charge
involves a specified drug or weapons offense punishable by ten years
186 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c)-(h) (Supp. 1985).
187 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(d)(2)(Supp. 1985). The Federal judge or magistrate may de-
tain a defendant temporarily for a period of up to 10 days. If the appropriate authorities
have not responded by that time, then the judicial officer will set conditions of release
for the defendant as in the normal fashion. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(d) (Supp. 1985).
188 Id.
189 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (e), (f) (Supp. 1985).
190 Id. at § 3142 (e).
191 Id. at § 3142 (f)(2)(B).
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confinement or more, or if the current charge involves a felony and
the defendant has a previous record of two or more felony convic-
tions.1 92 For persons in the second category, no presumption that
they should be released exists if persons charged with specified of-
fenses have prior convictions for those offenses, if such an offense
was committed while on pretrial release for a similar offense, and if
persons charged with such an offense had been convicted of a simi-
lar offense within the past five years or had been released from im-
prisonment for a similar offense within five years.' 93
To define the first and third categories of detainable defend-
ants, the judicial officer must decide that no conditions of release
will assure the defendant's appearance or protect the community
sufficiently. The judicial officer must make that prediction based on
"clear and convincing evidence" and a list of "factors to be consid-
ered" in determining whether any conditions of release will be suffi-
cient to minimize the defendant's risk of flight and crime. This list
generally resembles those in laws instructing judges how to decide
bail dating back to the Bail Reform Act of 1966.194 The principal
addition is the factor related to "the nature and seriousness of the
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the
person's release."' 195
The due process features of the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1984 compare to those of the other jurisdictions providing for de-
tention hearings or reviews of the conditions of release. These safe-
guards include a right to a hearing, the right to be present at the
hearing, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to offer
testimony, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses and the
right to prompt appeal. 196 In addition, a defendant is entitled to a
statement of the conditions or order of detention as well as to writ-
ten reasons for the judicial officer's decision. 197 The defendant is
informed in writing of the conditions of release and is required to
refrain from crimes or is subject to additional criminal penalties.' 98
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL ACT
The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 is the most decisive devel-
opment in the evolution of a public danger policy orientation in bail
192 Id. at § 3142 (e), (f).
193 Id. at § 3142 (e).
194 Id. at § 3142 (g).
195 Id. at § 3142 (g)(4).
196 Id. at § 3142 (0.
197 Id. at § 3142 (i).
198 Id. at §§ 3142 (h), 3146, 3147.
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and detention laws in the United States since the United States
Supreme Court decided Carlson v. Landon 19 9 in 1952. American ju-
risprudence has taken an undeniable step in institutionalizing an ap-
proach which, until the passage of the Federal law, was still
controversial, if increasingly popular in some form in many states.
Important questions remain unresolved, such as whether the United
States Supreme Court will find the Federal Act constitutional, and if
so, to what extent the diverse other danger laws will also be found
acceptable.
There have been a number of challenges testing the constitu-
tionality of the Federal Act on a variety of issues in cases that have
reached the United States Court of Appeals. Several courts refuted
the argument that preventive detention under the Federal Act was
punitive and therefore violative of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Relying on Martin, Wolfish and Edwards, each
court confirmed that, just as pretrial detention on the basis of risk of
flight was a legitimate regulatory function, detention based on com-
munity protection was also not "penal" in nature.200
In one federal district court, a defendant appealed his detention
by a magistrate under the Act claiming that it violated both the right
to bail implied in the eighth Amendment and the prohibition against
excessive bail.201 The court relied on dicta in Carlson v. Landon and
"the conclusion that history refutes an absolute right to bail" to dis-
miss the first contention and disagreed with the second argument
that denial of bail was tantamount to setting excessively high bail.20 2
Two courts addressed questions relating to the sufficiency of
the definition of danger applied in the federal preventive detention
measure. In United States v. Payden, a federal district court decision,
the defendant contended as part of a "void for vagueness" argu-
ment, that the statute did not "define the danger to which it ap-
plies." The court agreed but found the fact the statute did specify
"a number of factors to be considered by the court in ordering de-
tention" sufficient.20 3 A Third Circuit decision found that the legis-
lative history supported a conclusion that the danger referred to in
the Federal Act "be given broader construction than merely danger
of harm involving physical violence" and that a judicial officer could
199 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
200 United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384-85 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp.
1388, 1391-92 (1984).
201 Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1448-49.
202 Id.
203 Payden, 598 F. Supp. at 1395-96.
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view a defendant charged under the RICO statute for "conducting a
pattern of racketeering" as posing a danger and therefore detain the
defendant. 204
The remaining early challenges centered on various due pro-
cess issues. In United States v. Payden, a defendant appealing his de-
tention argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.20 5 The
court rejected the argument by finding the void-for-vagueness rea-
soning inapplicable: "[t]he new bail statute does not prohibit con-
duct, rather it establishes a framework for a judge to detain an
individual based on prediction of possible future conduct. A vague-
ness claim is therefore not appropriate for this statute. '20 6
In other cases, defendants have questioned the sufficiency of
procedures attendant to detention under the Federal Act. Two cir-
cuit courts have ruled that the safeguards in the law are sufficient,
and exceed the minimum required based on Martin and Gerstein and
that detention hearings did not have to be "mini-trials. '20 7 The
First Circuit also found that hearsay was permissible in these hear-
ings. 208 At this early stage, thus, it is clear both that the Act is being
used with some frequency, 20 9 and that so far the decisions have re-
pelled attacks on its constitutionality.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF PRETRIAL DANGER MEASURES
A. CONFUSING THE DETERRENT VERSUS THE INCAPACITATIVE AIMS OF
PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION
The marked expansion of pretrial detention as well as the addi-
tion of an explicit danger orientation in the determination of condi-
tions of release in recent laws carry important implications for bail
theory in American criminal jurisprudence. Because under tradi-
tional practices pretrial detention was effected through the use of
cash bail rather than by direct detention decisions, 210 the deterrent
and incapacitative functions of the bail process often have been con-
fused and too easily mixed with inappropriate punitive aims.
204 United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, (3d Cir. 1985).
205 "The defendant contends that the 'statute fails to give notice of the conduct which
will lead to pre-trial detention.'" Payden, 598 F. Supp. at 1395.
206 Id. at 1396.
207 Delker, 757 F.2d at 1397;Jessup, 757 F.2d at 386-87.
208 United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1985).
209 See Pretrial Reporter VIII/3 at 4-5 (Dec. 1984); U.S. Marshals Service, United
States Marshals Service First Year Implementation of Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 (U.S. Dept. ofJustice 1986).
210 The only "direct" detention decisions under traditional laws have been the denial
of bail to persons charged with either capital offenses, or in some states, treason and
offenses punishable by life imprisonment. See Table I in the Appendix.
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Although cash bail is often set to cause the detention of defendants,
an incapacitative use, it is frequently and misleadingly discussed as if
it were intended as a deterent to flight.2 1' Figure 1 outlines the
theoretical underpinnings of the bail task.
FIGURE 1









The pretrial release/detention task begins the same way, no
matter which theoretical rationale is employed. First the judge must
digest available information to assess the likely danger, or more
broadly, risk of flight as well as danger, represented by a given de-
fendant. A judge will select a deterrent or an incapacitative ap-
proach based on a predictive assessment. For low-to moderate-risk
211 It is this distinction between deterrent and incapacitative uses of bail that has re-
sulted, for example, in the provisions of laws in Wisconsin, the District of Columbia and
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 that permits cash bail to be set as a condition of
release (to deter flight only) and prohibit its use to bring about a defendant's detention
(to incapacitate a public safety menace). These laws require that incapacitative deten-
tion be decided and reviewed explicitly and directly.' See Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 8; 18
U.S.C.A. § 3142(c) (Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1321(a) (1981 & Supp. 1985); Wis.
STAT. § 969.01,- .02 (1985).
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defendants, in cases in which the defendant's interest in remaining
at large outweighs the risk to the public or to judicial processes, the
judge may opt for a specific deterrence approach. In order to mini-
mize the chances that an individual defendant will abscond or en-
gage in a serious crime, the judge selects the condition of release
that counterbalances the level of risk represented by the defendant.
The deterrent threat underlying the selected conditions is that more
severe conditions may replace the original choice, release may be
revoked or, if cash bail had been assigned, the defendant may face
financial loss. 2 12 The requirement in some jurisdictions that the de-
fendant must face additional criminal penalties if apprehended after
absconding, or if convicted of a crime during pretrial release, re-
flects a deterrence orientation.
In selecting a specific deterrent option, the judge wishes to
guard against both insufficiently deterring the defendant and need-
lessly burdening the defendant with an oppressive release option
designed for higher risk defendants. Should the judge, in weighing
the available information, determine that no release option could
deter the defendant from flight or crime during the pretrial period,
the decision would shift into the incapacitative mode.21 3
When operating within the incapacitative mode, the bail judge
once again begins by considering a range of conditions that, while
permitting a defendant to remain at liberty, might sufficiently con-
strain the defendant from engaging in misconduct (flight and/or
crime) during a period of pretrial release. From this perspective, a
judge might prefer a "partial-incapacitation" approach for low to
moderate risks and choose to require regular reporting to a proba-
tion or police officer, to remain in home detention-or, even, to
212 From this perspective, commentators have raised questions about the deterrent
properties of cash bail. See, e.g., Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 7. Foote
argued that bondsman-brokered financial bail served no deterrent ends, for the defend-
ant would neither gain back the fee paid to the bondsman to post the bail even with a
perfect attendance record at court, nor would the defendant realistically face having to
pay the full amount of the bail for which the bondsman would be responsible in the
event of flight. Others have suggested that third party deposit bail does in fact retain
deterrent value. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, supra
note 9. That is, with the court accepting a percentum of the full bail amount (in effect
donning the role of the bondsman), a relative posts the defendant's bail. The theory is
that the threat of financial loss on the part of a wife or parent would prove a powerful
deterrent to misconduct by the defendant during the pretrial period. See also J.
GOLDKAMP & M. GOTrFREDSON, supra note 34.
213 Under this formulation, detention cannot be a result of a deterrence-oriented bail
decision, unless, conceivably, the judge has in mind a short period of detention (caused
by setting bail inconveniently but not impossibly high) designed to teach a lesson about
what might be in store if the defendant engages in misconduct during the subsequent
period of pretrial release.
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wear an "ankle bracelet" capable of transmitting the defendant's
whereabouts to the supervising agency.
In cases in which the judge has determined both that a deter-
rent approach and a partially incapacitative approach will not assure
the public safety (or the defendant's appearance in court), outright
detention would represent the most drastic incapacitative decision
option. The aim in employing detention would, thus, not be special
deterrence but rather elimination of the defendant from society for
the duration prior to adjudication of the case. In these instances,
the predictive assessment of the judge (or of the legislature in draft-
ing the detention statutes) has led to the assumption that no less
onerous condition of release could serve as a sufficient constraint to
the defendant,2 14 and that the defendant's interest in continued lib-
erty is far outweighed by the public's right to safety. Thus, in the
usual sense of the term, pretrial detention cannot serve as a deter-
rent, although it is premised as well on a predictive assessment;
rather it seeks the defendant's temporary removal from the at-risk
population through incapacitation.
If this model accurately depicts the theoretical goals of the bail
function, then the current bail laws carry inevitable implications for
these deterrent and incapacitative goals. To illustrate, a large
number of jurisdictions have adopted provisions outlining a range
of bail options and have instructed judges that the least onerous
condition of release sufficient to minimize a defendant's risk ought
to be selected.215 In these states, both deterrent and incapacitative
conditions of release are incorporated within the legal framework.
No research has demonstrated, however, the appropriateness of de-
terrent versus incapacitative uses nor the effectiveness of the appli-
cation of conditions of release in line with either theoretical
perspective.2 1 6 In addition, commentators have seriously ques-
214 See, e.g., jurisdictions that permit detention when "no one or more conditions of
release will reasonably assure that the person will not... pose a danger to any other
person or the community." This theme, derived from a provision of the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1966 dealing with release of defendants charged in capital cases or con-
victed persons seeking release before appeal (18 U.S.C.A. § 3148 (Supp. 1985)), has
been adapted, using similar language, in Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida and
Wisconsin. See ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 22; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 8;
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1322(a)(1), (b)(2), 1323(c)(B) (1981 & Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT.
§ 969.035(6)(b) (1985). See also similar provisions of the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e), (f) (Supp. 1985); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL
SERVICES AGENCIES, supra note 9 at vi-c.
215 See Table 3 in the Appendix.
216 Missing from the bail literature are studies of the differential effectiveness of re-
lease conditions for given risk-defined categories of defendants when decisions are ori-
ented to either deterrent or incapacitative goals. But see J. GOLDKAMP & M.
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tioned the deterrent value of financial bail, some arguing that it of-
fers little advantage in securing a defendant's appearance and
provides little constraint against defendants who, once they have
purchased their release, will commit new crimes.2 17
Moreover, evaluation of actual bail practices based on this ana-
lytic framework prompts concern about the current use of condi-
tions of release when the deterrent and incapacitative goals are
uncritically confused: just as incapacitative pretrial detention may
be totally inappropriate to large numbers of persons confined, to a
lesser degree, onerous conditions of release may be inappropriate
and may unnecessarily impose control over defendants who would
perform perfectly well if instead released on ROR without any ad-
ded conditions. If a goal of pretrial release decisionmaking includes
balancing the risk posed by the defendant against the presumptive
interest of the defendant to unrestrained pretrial liberty, then use of
conditions of release for either theoretical purpose must be tem-
pered by the question: How does the judge know this defendant
would not perform perfectly well on unconditioned or less re-
stricted pretrial release? 21 8
Incapacitative pretrial detention, besides denying freedom on
the basis of unproven past acts and anticipated future conduct, has
other potentially serious drawbacks, although the courts have not
appeared persuaded by them. First, because incapacitative deten-
tion rests on a predictive (often subjective) assessment of the risks
posed by individuals accused of crimes, it will produce mistakes:
some defendants will be released and go on to commit serious
crimes and some defendants will be needlessly confined who would
never have committed future crimes or who may be absolved of
their current criminal charges. Recent research has suggested that
GOTrFREDSON (recent Philadelphia experiment), supra note 34. The Washington, D.C.
Pretrial Services Agency is a pioneer in the development of conditions of release
designed to respond to specific kinds of risks posed by the defendant, although not
based as yet on empirical research. See District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency,
Recommendation Guidelines, 1981. This report states that "any restrictive condition im-
posed must relate to the risk posed ... and be designed to minimize that risk not elimi-
nate it. Total elimination of all risk is an inappropriate and unconstitutional standard."
Id. at 7. Research describing the use of urine testing to supervise defendants during
pretrial release is forthcoming from that agency.
217 See supra note 212.
218 As part of the National Evaluation of Pretrial Release (Phase I), Thomas evaluated
the use of supervised conditional release in Washington, D.C. His findings offer evi-
dence of the possible unnecessary use of more onerous bail conditions. He reported
that "where previously over forty percent of the defendants in the District were released
on OR without conditions, by 1972 less than five percent were so released." Thus, a
large segment of defendants who had established their reliability on straight OR release
were burdened with conditions." W. THOMAS, supra note 5, at chapter 15.
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the margin of error may be as poor as ten inappropriate confine-
ments to secure one appropriately-held.2 1 9 von Hirsch underscores
this point of view in arguing that:
if a system of preventive incarceration is known systematically to gen-
erate mistaken confinements, then it is unacceptable in absolute terms
because it violates the obligation of society to individual justice. Such a
system cannot be justified by arguing that its aggregate social benefits
exceed the aggregate amount of injustice done to mistakenly confined
individuals.220
The proponents of pretrial detention as pretrial incapacitation
measures either do not address or purposely beg the questions of
error surrounding predictive pretrial incapacitation. As timeworn
as discussions of false positives in pretrial detention may be, the in-
escapably poor record associated with any use of incapacitative
measures must be confronted, especially because of the questiona-
ble effectiveness of due process measures at this stage of the system.
Given that the substance of current statutes clearly announces an
expanded role for pretrial incapacitation, it would be unrealistic to
expect incapacitative detention provisions to effectuate better pre-
dictions of dangerous behavior than judges traditionally have
produced. 22'
Second, pretrial incapacitation rests on a highly questionable
assumption that removing certain categories of defendants from so-
ciety will prevent large amounts of crime. 222 Research findings have
seriously questioned this assumption in two ways: persons held on
more onerous bail conditions generally may be releasable under
lesser options with no worse result, 223 and detention of defendants
designated as detainable by statute results in very large amounts of
unnecessary detention and is likely to contribute greatly to jail over-
crowding but very little to the reduction of crime.224
219 See Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 20, at 318.
220 von Hirsch, supra note 59, at 740 (emphasis in original).
221 In fact, in a test of the predictive validity of the District of Columbia detention
statute, Angel, et. al., found the detention criteria to be poorly related to the commis-
sion of the feared, serious crimes. See generally, Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120.
222 Currently, the virtue of "selective" incapacitation is hotly debated in the arena of
sentencing. See P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACrrATION (1982);
Blackmore & Welsh, Selective Incapacitation: Sentencing According to Risk, 29 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 504 (Oct. 1983); von Hirsch & Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation: Some Queries
About Research Design and Equity, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE (1974).
223 See W. THOMAS, supra note 5; Ares, Rankin & Sturz, supra note 5; Gottfredson, supra
note 126; Toborg, supra note 138. See also a report by Austin, Krisberg, and Litsky
(forthcoming, National Institute of Justice, 1985) (national study of "supervised" pre-
trial release conducted by NCCD).
224 See Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120; but see Goldkamp, Questioning the Prac-
tice of Pretrial Detention: Some Evidence from Philadelphia, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
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B. THE PRACTICAL UTILITY OF CURRENT PRETRIAL DANGER MEASURES
Apart from the narrow use of bail and pretrial detention to pro-
tect witnesses and/or jurors from intimidation by defendants, dan-
ger in bail laws usually translates as a concern to prevent crime
committed by defendants during pretrial release. Compared to the
dramatic scope of the recent revision of bail laws to incorporate pre-
trial danger measures, the actual phenomenon of pretrial crime may
seem minor. Estimates of pretrial crime vary widely. 225 Toborg re-
viewed available studies and reported that from ten to seventeen
percent of persons arrested for crimes had been on pretrial release
for previous charges at the time of their arrests. 226 Studies follow-
ing up noncomparable samples of released defendants have found
varying proportions subsequently rearrested for crimes committed
during the pretrial period, averaging from ten to twenty percent;
only about half of the rearrests were for crimes of the serious variety
of primary concern in the recent danger laws and even less were
later convicted of them.227 Although any number of serious crimes
represents a grave challenge to the ability of law enforcement to
protect the public, their low rates of commission by defendants dur-
ing pretrial release make them difficult to reduce through the rela-
tively gross incapacitative device of pretrial detention. Available
research suggests that to reduce a five percent rate of rearrest for
serious crimes among released defendants a percentage point or
two in ajurisdiction would require increasing the use of pretrial de-
tention substantially and systematically. 228
1556 (1983)(jails may in fact be holding defendants who pose the greatest risks of ab-
sconding and pretrial crime).
225 Studies of pretrial danger inevitably are forced to rely on arrests of defendants
who have committed crimes during pretrial release associated with earlier charges. This
measure suffers the same handicaps that arrest data generally are known to carry with
them. They poorly reflect the actual level of crime, some persons rearrested did not
commit the crimes for which they were arrested while others who committed crimes
have not been rearrested, and only a fraction of those rearrested will be convicted of the
crimes. See Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120, at 317-23.
226 This estimate includes arrests for any crimes, not just for serious crimes such as
those serving as the focus of most of the preventive detention laws. See Toborg, Yezer,
Tseng & Carpenter, Pretrial Release Assessment of Danger and Flight: Method Makes a Differ-
ence (paper presented at Conference on Public Danger, Dangerous Offenders and the
CriminalJustice System, Harvard University 1982), at 2. See also W. THOMAS, supra note
5.
227 S. CLARKE, J. FREEMAN & G. KOCH, supra note 126;J. GOLDKAMP & M. GoTrFRED-
SON, supra note 34; J. ROTH & P. WICE, supra note 34; T. THOMAS, supra note 5; Angel,
Preventive Detention, supra note 120; Gottfredson, supra note 126.
228 See e.g., Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120. See alsoJ. GOLDKAMP & M. GoTr-
FREDSON, supra note 34 (description of the guidelines experiment in Philadelphia in
which one group of randomly selected judges employed decision guidelines based in
part on an actuarial classification of defendants).
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Although the goal of recent measures to protect society from
defendants who would take advantage of pretrial release to prey
upon the public or upon victims or witnesses now appears legally
appropriate, in the aggregate the revised bail and pretrial detention
laws risk being neither effective nor just. In attacking the pretrial
danger problem, a number of previous recommendations continue
to merit consideration. For example, a number of observers have
suggested that the length of time required to bring a defendant to
trial ought to be kept to a minimum.229 Others have proposed a
diminishing presumption to release, or to release on ROR or other
of the least onerous conditions, when defendants granted pretrial
release either abscond or are rearrested for crimes committed dur-
ing the period of pretrial release. 230 Several states and the Federal
government which favor a strong initial presumption to release
under nonfinancial conditions reserve the power to revoke pretrial
release, 23 1 or to institute stiff criminal penalties for abuse of pretrial
release through absconding or arrests for new crimes. 23 2
C. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM OF PRETRIAL DANGER
If bail and pretrial detention laws are to be modified in reaction
to fears about the phenomenon of defendant danger, then the con-
cept of danger has to be defined as precisely as possible. In the laws
229 See S. CLARKE, J. FREEMAN & G. KOCH, supra note 126; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, supra note 9; Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120;
Gottfredson, supra note 126. Note that the implementation of truly speedy trials which
would have the effect of shortening the period released defendants would be "at-isk"
may come into conflict with another common recommendation that detained defendants
be placed on an accelerated court calendar. That concept is contained in the statutes of
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota and Wisconsin. See Table 9 in the Appendix.
230 See STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 7; A.B.A., Pretrial Release,
supra note 31; Angel, Preventive Detention, supra note 120; von Hirsch, supra note 59.
231 See supra note 165. See also Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A.
§3142(c)(2) (Supp. 1985).
232 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3146, 3147 (Supp. 1985); WIs. CONST. art. I, § 8(3); ALASKA
STAT. § 12.30.060; (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-723.1 (1971); CAL. [PENAL] CODE
§ 1320 (Deering 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 1321(c), 1327, 1328 (1974); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 110 (1980 & Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 638A(b) (1957 & Supp.
1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-909 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 597(14)(a) (1974); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-3-9 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-543 (1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2937.99 (Page 1975); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 162.195, 162.205 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4956 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7559(d) (1974); VA. CODE § 19.2-128 (1950);
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.19.130 (1980); Wis. STAT. § 969.035(ii) (1985); MINN. RULES
CRIM. PROC. 6.02(3); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2(d). The same provisions in
the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania enhance the penalty for crimes committed
during pretrial release for earlier charges.
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to date, with few exceptions, this is a major shortcoming, although it
is not apparently perceived as such by the courts. Rigorously devel-
oped knowledge of the phenomenon of concern ought to guide for-
mulation of precise definitions on which strategies may be
grounded, including sound estimates of the frequency of serious
pretrial crime as well as of the harm or loss resulting from it. In-
cluded in this definitional focus should be an attempt to differenti-
ate the deterrent and incapacitative functions of the bail process, to
realign the bail function so that it responds to those concerns
pragmatically, if indeed they are viewed to be desirable or legiti-
mate, and to clarify the use of release and of incarceration.
In selecting conditions of release to deter potential pretrial "re-
cidivists," for example, it is essential to evaluate the effects of the
commonly employed conditions on the occurrence of pretrial crime,
such as the posited deterrent impact of cash bail. Incapacitative
strategies must confront questions about their constitutional impli-
cations, which are dramatic and must not much longer be over-
looked, 233 as well as prevent or reduce the incidence of serious
crime committed by released defendants. If the policy debate con-
cludes that pretrial incapacitation is inappropriate and unaccept-
able, current laws as well as further reforms must be altered
fundamentally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Once the dangers that form the basis of bail and detention pro-
cedures are better defined, better studied and understood, there re-
mains the difficult issue of balancing potential "progress" in
minimizing pretrial crime against the costs to defendants and to the
justice system when those procedures are applied. The idealistic
goal that restrictive bail or "selective" pretrial detention practices
should be targeted on the greatest risks among all defendants
should be weighed against the knowledge that it is exceedingly diffi-
cult to know with reasonable accuracy who the greatest risks are and
that procedures that screen defendants, whether empirically derived
233 Clearly, questions are raised about the notion of presumption of innocence by
giving legitimacy to the practice of incapacitating defendants at the pretrial stage.
Although the United States Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish asserted that pretrial deten-
tion is not punitive and that it does not conflict with the presumption of innocence, a
concept applying mainly to the trial stage, pretrial detention as pretrial incapacitation of
the criminally accused has not been discussed. 441 U.S. 520, 535-38 (1979). The new
Federal statute explicitly recognizes the issue but simply states that "[nothing in this
section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence." 18
U.S.C.A. § 3142(0) (Supp. 1985).
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or based on official "conventional wisdom," will be clumsy and pro-
duce sizeable margins of error.
The only conceivable counterpoint to this troublesome reality,
although arguably an inadequate remedy, will be for policy makers
to give equal attention to due process rights of defendants eligible
for preventive bail or incapacitative confinement. Although the
courts have been satisfied with the safeguards in the District of Co-
lumbia and the Federal law, not many jurisdictions possess similar
procedures. "Tough" pretrial detention measures that are not bal-
anced by sufficient due process constraints and are not monitored
for effectiveness may eventually amount to a "tail wagging the dog"
as court calendars become further overburdened, the prosecutor
becomes immeshed more deeply in routine bail decisions, and the
populations of jails breach even the extraordinary present levels.
Critics still may argue that even with the apparently elaborate
due process safeguards of the new Federal law, or of the Wisconsin
or District of Columbia measures, the shortcomings of pretrial inca-
pacitation cannot easily be redressed. Procedures that authorize de-
tention on the basis of anticipated but unprovable future conduct
nevertheless accept the predictability of dangerousness on faith.
No matter how elaborate the safeguards, if a defendant falls
within one of the diverse categories specified in the new laws as
detainable, the defendant cannot demonstrate very easily that a
feared future act will not occur; because of the detention, the propo-
sition is untestable. Moreover, by the time a wrongly-held defend-
ant is able to carry appeals of his or her detention to the highest
levels, the question will probably be moot due to the completion of
the pretrial period.
The current pretrial danger laws generally have ignored poten-
tially the most important area: the front-line decisionmaking prac-
tices of criminal court judges.23 4 Judicial bail practices have
suffered because judges have conducted bail in a low-visibility,
highly improvisational fashion with little meaningful guidance con-
cerning how to transact bail to realize optimal results. What the
United States Supreme Court has recently referred to as "exper-
ienced prediction" in bail practice often amounts to guessing con-
ducted in a vacuum.23 5 Judges have not had the opportunity to
monitor the results of their individual decisions over time, nor to
compare their practices and results with those of their colleagues.
234 The laws of Wisconsin and North Carolina, which require courts to develop guide-
lines or policies to implement the aims of bail at the court level, are rare exceptions. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-535 (1983); Wis. STAT. § 969.065 (1985).
235 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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The only results most judges learn about are the rare but sensa-
tional cases involving defendants whom they have released and who
then have committed especially atrocious crimes. Such feedback
generates cumulatively more conservative decisionmaking, out of
proportion with former successful bail decisions.
Constructive experimentation focusing on pretrial release and
detention decisionmaking by the judiciary is almost nonexistent. 23 6
Thus, judicial decisionmaking has not "learned from experience" in
a balanced manner. Future pretrial danger strategies will have to
develop methods for assisting courts in reviewing their operating
bail policies, in organizing their discretionary and improvisational
release and detention practices, and in monitoring their conse-
quences. In the final analysis, hope for affecting the phenomenon of
pretrial crime depends on the ability of the bail judge to make an
informed decision from within a rational policy framework.
236 For a discussion of one recent effort to assist the judges in the Philadelphia crimi-
nal courts to review bail practices and develop bail policy, seeJ. GOLDKAMP & M. Gor-




[Note: A = Constitution B = Statutes or court rules]
Limitations on right to bail Proof and Presumption Excessiveness
Capital Cases Life Imp. Others Clause Prohibition
Jurisdiction
Alabama AB - ABI AB3  A
Alaska AB - - A A
Arizona A - AB2  A A
Arkansas AB - B2  A A
California A - A 2  A 3  A
Colorado A - A 2 A A
Connecticut AB - - A A
Delaware AB - - AB A
D.C. B - B
2  
- A 4
Florida AB - AB A A 4
Georgia B - B2  B3  A
Hawaii - B B
2  B AB4
Idaho AB - - AB AB
Illinois AB A AB2  AB -
Indiana A - A 2  A A
Iowa A - B2  A A
Kansas AB - - AB A
Kentucky AB - - AB A
Louisiana A - - A A
Maine A 1  B - A A
Maryland B B B 2  - A
Massachusetts B - B 2  - A
Michigan AB - AB 2  A A
Minnesota A - B2  A A
Mississippi A - - A A
Missouri AB - - A A
Montana A - - A A
Nebraska A - A 2 A A
Nevada A A AB 2  AB A
New Hampshire B - - B A
New Jersey AB - - AB A
New Mexico A - - A A
New York B - B2  - A
North Carolina B - B2  - A
North Dakota A - - A A
Ohio A - - A A
Oklahoma AB - - A A
Oregon AB - AR 2  A A
Pennsylvania A - - A A
Rhode Island AB AB - A A
South Carolina A A - A 3 A
South Dakota AB - - A A
Tennessee AB - - AB AB
4
Texas A - A 2  A A
Utah AB - B2  A A
Vermont AB A - A 3 A
Virginia - - B2  B3  A
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PROVISIONS LIMITING THE RIGHT TO BAIL IN THE
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[Note: A = Constitution B = Statutes or court rules]
Limitations on right to bail Proof and Presumption Excessiveness
Capital Cases Life Imp. Others Clause Prohibition
Jurisdiction
West Virginia B B - - A




Wyoming A B - A A
Federal B - B2  - A
tIn Alabama and Maine, there are slight variations of the traditional constitutional exclusion of
bail from persons in capital cases. In Alabama, in addition to persons charged with capital crimes,
persons charged with crimes involving "serious injury likely to produce death" are denied bail. ALA.
CONsT. Art. I, § 16. In Maine, the constitution denies bail to persons charged with "any of the
crimes which now are, or have been denominated capital offenses since the adoption of the
Constitution." ME. CONsT. Art. I, § 9.
2 For a discussion of the "other" categories of defendants beyond those capitally charged or
eligible for sentences of life imprisonment, see Table 6 in the Appendix.
3Alabama, California, Georgia, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia have employed language
that varies from the traditional instruction that bail may be denied in capital cases "when the proof
is evident and the presumption is great." See ALA. CONST. Art. I, § 16; CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 12; GA.
CODE § 27-901 (1983); S.C. CONST. Art. I, § 15; VT. CoNsT. Art. II, § 40; VA. CODE § 19.2-120
(1982).
4 The excessiveness prohibition in the Constitution (eighth amendment) applies to the District of
Columbia. Most states have adopted the wording of the Constitution literally. Illinois has no
excessiveness prohibition. The Florida constitution states that defendants are "entitled to release
on reasonable bail with sufficient surety." See FLA. CONsT. Art. I, § 14. In Hawaii, in addition to the
traditional constitutional prohibition against excessiveness, HAWAsI REv. STAT. § 804-9 states that
bail "should be so determined as not to suffer the wealthy to escape by the payment of pecuniary
penalty, nor to render the privilege useless to the poor." In Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-
17), the law provides additionally that "[s]uch bail shall be set as low as the court determines is
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REFERENCES TO DANGER/PuBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS IN
BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION LAWS IN THE




Safety of the community
Danger to the public
Inimical to public safety
Protect the public from the
defendant
Safety of any other person or the
community
Danger to any other person or the
community
Threat to any other person or the
community or property within the
community
Danger... to himself and the
person of others
Defendant's physical condition is
such to jeopardize his safety or
that of others
Physical or mental condition will
jeopardize neither himself nor the
public
Physical, mental or emotional
condition.. . danger to himself
or others
II. Greater General Danger
Public would be placed in significant
peril
Unreasonable danger to the
community will result
Protect the community against
unreasonable danger from
criminal defendant
Unreasonable danger to himself or
the public
Substantial danger to any other
person or to the community
III. Danger of Serious Crime
Will commit a serious crime
Substantial danger that the








District of Columbia, Federal












Hawaii, New Mexico, North Carolina
Washington
1985]
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TABLE 4 (CONT'D)
REFERENCES TO DANGER/PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS IN
BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES, DECEMBER, 1984
DANGER REFERENCE
IV. Danger of Bodily Harm
Protect the community from risk of
physical harm to persons
Danger of injury to any person
Prevent imminent bodily harm to
accused or another
Threat of immediate physical harm
to himself or others
Would result in great bodily harm to
others
Threat of bodily harm to arrested
person or another
Protect members of the community
from serious bodily harm
V. Intimidation or Harm of Witnesses
Seek to intimidate witnesses
Prevent intimidation of witnesses
Risk of intimidating witnesses
threats made against victims or
witnesses
Person threatens, injures, intimidates
* . . prospective witness or juror
Will create a threat of bodily harm
to another
Has threatened another with bodily
harm
VI. Interfering with the Administration
Justice
Assure the integrity of the judicial
process





















Hawaii, New Mexico, Washington,
Illinois
Georgia, Federal
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TABLE 5
KIND OF PROVISION CONTAINING REFERENCE TO DANGER
CONCERNS IN BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES,
DECEMBER, 1984
[Note: A = provision found in constitution
B = provision found in statutes or court rules]
KINDS OF PROVISIONS
Discussion of Discussion of
Limitation on purpose for (ROR) factors to be
right to bail conditions of weighed in fixing






Colorado A B B
Delaware B B
District of Columbia B B B
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ASSESSMENT OF DANGER RISK AS A CRITERION FOR PRETRIAL
DETENTION OR MORE ONEROUS CONDITIONS OF RELEASE IN BAIL
AND PRETRIAL DETENTION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES,
DECEMBER, 1984













ROR: "unless the officer determines that the release of the
person . . . will pose a danger"
Person charged with felony offenses detained: "if the person
. . . poses a substantial danger to the community and no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the safety ....
a) In pretrial release inquiry: "the possibility of violations of
law if the defendant is released without restriction ....
b) In setting conditions: "if there exists a danger that the
defendant will commit a serious crime or will seek to
intimidate witnesses ....
Detention: if the court finds that there is a substantial
likelihood the person's release would result in great bodily
harm
a) ROR: "unless. . . the continued detention or posting of a
surety is necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm"
b) In fixing financial bail: "factors indicating the possibility of
violations of law if released. . . or. . . the likelihood that
there will be an intimidation or larassment of possible
witnesses ... "
c) Detention: if found "that the public would be placed in
significant periT"
a) ROR: "consistent with.., the safety of the community"
b) Bail generally: Such . . . as . . . will assure the safety of
the community."
a) ROR: "unless . . . will not. . . reasonably assure the
safety of any other person or the community"
b) Detention: if "there is no condition or combination of
conditions which will reasonably assure the safety of the
community"
a) Detention: "if no condition of release can reasonably
protect the community from risk of physical harm to
persons ... "
b) Bail or other conditions: depending on "the nature and
probability of danger which the defendant's release poses to
the community"
Detained defendants may be released: if "poses no significant
threat or danger to any person or to the community or to any
property.... ; no significant risk of committing any felony
pending trial. . .... . poses no significant risk of
intimidating witnesses. .... "
Assign conditions or deny release: if "there exists a danger
that the defendant will commit a serious crime or will seek to
intimidate witnesses or will otherwise unlawfully interfere with
the orderly administration ofjustice"
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TABLE 8 (CONT'D)
ASSESSMENT OF DANGER RISK AS A CRITERION FOR PRETRIAL
DETENTION OR MORE ONEROUS CONDITIONS OF RELEASE IN BAIL
















ASSESSMENT OF DANGER RISK
Additional conditions: "if... court finds that such
conditions are reasonably necessary to ... protect the public
from the defendant... "
In fixing bail: judge should be "considerate of past criminal
acts and the reasonably anticipated conduct of the defendant
if released... "
Revocation of pretrial release (60 days detention): "if court
determines . . . prisoner will seriously endanger any person
or the community ....
Detained defendants may be released: if "the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely
... to pose a danger to any other person ... "
a) Additional conditions: if "such release will be inimical to
public safety"
b) Domestic violence, conditions or detention: if release "will
create a threat of bodily harm to the arrested person or
another"
ROR: when "defendant is of such condition, both physical
and mental, that his release will jeopardize neither himself nor
the public... "
Additional conditions: "upon a showing that there exists a
danger that the defendant will commit a serious crime, will
seek to intimidate witnesses... "
a) Conditions: if release of defendant "will pose a danger of
injury ... is likely to result in the destruction of evidence,
subornation of perjury, or intimidation of potential
witnesses ....
b) Domestic violence, additional conditions or detention:
"... The immediate release of the defendant will pose a
danger of injury to the alleged victim or to any other person
or is likely to result in the intimidation of the victim .. "
ROR in misdemeanors: "a person need not be released on
his own recognizance . . . if his physical, mental or emotional
condition appears to be such that he may pose a danger to
himself or to others if released immediately... "
Release criteria: "any facts indicating the possibility of
violations of law... "
ROR for misdemeanors: when "the defendant poses no threat
of immediate physical harm to himself or others"
ROR: "unless the court determines in its discretion that...
unreasonable danger to the community will result"
ROR: "unless the court determines in the exercise of his
discretion . . . that the defendant will pose a danger to any
other person or to the community . . "
1985] BAIL REFORM
TABLE 8 (CONT'D)
ASSESSMENT OF DANGER RISK AS A CRITERION FOR PRETRLAL
DETENTION OR MORE ONEROUS CONDMONS OF RELEASE IN BAIL
AND PRETRIAL DETENTION LAWS N THE UNITED STATES,
DECEMBER, 1984
JURISDICTION ASSESSMENT OF DANGER RISK
24. Vermont ROR: "unless the court determines in the exercise of his
discretion ... that the defendant will pose a danger to the
public .... "
25. Virginia May be detained: if "there is probable cause to believe that
... his liberty wilF constitute an unreasonable danger to
himself and the public"
26. Washington Additional conditions: "upon a showing that there exists a
substantial danger that the defendant will commit a serious
crime or that the defendant's condition is such to jeopardize
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